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Martin Luther King, Jr., once remarked that the 
"disenchanted, the disadvantaged and the disinherited seem 
at the time of deep crisis, to summon up some sort of genius 
that enables them to perceive and capture the appropriate 
weapons to carve out their destiny. 111 For King and the Civil 
Rights Movement in .America this "weapon" was nonviolent 
direct action. It was a weapon which "inspired and informed 
far flung movements which included sit-ins, boycotts and 
mass marches; it became clear that a new method of protest 
action had been born. 112 
Even though nonviolent means of social protest have been 
shown to be effective, 3 violent and destructive means of 
social protest are still widely used as weapons by the disen-
franchised and disinherited. Terrorism, including knee-
capping, kidnapping, and assassination, appears to be the 
tactic of choice for many radical protest groups. Those 
advocating a violent approach to conflict see the destruction 
of the opposition's values as an essential pre-requisite for 
improvement and re-integration. 
There are also many who believe that social conflict 
cast within a framework of violence, destruction, and 
competition only serves to intensify conflict and make the 
1 
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management and/or resolution of conflict more difficult. In 
contrast, they believe that a nonviolent, cooperative orien-
tation to social conflict should (will) lead to its easy 
resolution. 4 Thus, supporters of a nonviolent approach to 
social conflict advocate its use because of their assumption 
that it is less costly than violent means of social protest. 5 
One of the assumptions of this position is that conflict 
is an inevitable aspect of human interaction. Humans are 
brought together in the pursuit of goals and needs, some of 
which are complementary; and some, contradictory. However, 
one aspect of human interaction and integration is fundamen-
tal; even though people may be in pursuit of individual 
goals and satisfaction. They are inescapably interdependent 
with their fellows. This fundamental interdependence is 
the basis for the assumption that within conflict there is 
always the possibility of some kind of mutually advantageous 
outcome. 
As Frost and Wilmot argue, the key to understanding 
"destructive" conflict is recognizing the attempts of one 
party, within an interdependent relationship, to unilaterally 
assert control; changing the structure and expectations of 
the relationship, restricting the choices, and altering the 
rewards which accrue to parties involved. 6 Advocates of 
nonviolence argue that their approach is more productive, 
emphasizing the fundamental interdependence of social agents, 
and pursuing a course of action which helps to create an 
atmosphere conducive to bargaining and negotiation. 
The search for a more humane, less destructive 
approach to the management of social conflict is a worthy 
pursuit in itself; however, the interests of the social 
scientist go beyond the ethical dimensions of its practice 
to the more pragmatic concerns of explanation: what it is 
and how it works. Of particular interest to the communica-
tion theorist is the special role which communication plays 
in the process of conflict resolution. 
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Nonviolence, as a strategy of social protest, is parti-
cularly interesting because it speaks where violence is 
wordless. Thomas Merton, speaking from a Gandhian perspec-
tive, perhaps best expresses this point of view when he says 
that it is within the public, political realm that issues 
are decided "in a way worthy of free men: by persuasion and 
words, not by violence. Violence is essentially wordless, 
and it can begin only where thought and rational communica-
tion have broken down. 11 7 
Nonviolent direct action is a form of communication in 
a very real sense. It is a language of action which 
communicates not only ideas, but feelings and attitudes as 
well. 8 As a strategy its objective is to create a situation 
wherein the parties may meet as equals and exercise mutual 
influence, one over the other. It seeks to create a rela-
tionship wherein "genuine·argument" can be pursued. 9 It 
seeks to create a bargaining situation. 
Where there are those who would speak of nonviolence 
as a way of forcing change, there are others who view it as 
4 
a means to reforge and reintegrate all the elements of the 
community. Schelling speaks of nonviolence as a strategy 
whereby either side may, if adequately disciplined and organ-
ized, exert enough power and control to turn an asymmetry of 
force into a two-sided bargaining situation. 10 It attempts, 
through various mechanisms and tactics, to force confronta-
tion of issues; to equalize the balance of power so as to 
provide both sides with a functionally equivalent amount of 
influence in the decisions which affect their lives. Non-
violence, unlike violence, is not a strategy of domination 
but, rather, one of dialogue, adjustment and adaptation. 
Within this context there is no guarantee that the protestors 
will "win." 
Martin Luther King, Jr., when asked why he advocated 
peaceful resistance responded by writing: 
You may well ask, 'why direct action? why sit-ins, 
marches, etc.? Isn't negotiation a better path?' 
You are exactly right in your call for negotiation. 
Indeed, this is the purpose of direct action. Non-
violent direct action seeks to create such a crisis 
and establish such creative tension that a community 
that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced 
to confront the issue. It seeks to dramatize the 
issue which can no longer be ignored.11 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create dialogue 
where, before, none had existed. It seeks to force those 
in a position of power and domination to re-examine the 
social situation from the vantage point of equals. It seeks 
through coercion and persuasion, through economic and moral 
means, through confrontation and negotiation, to restructure 
society along the lines of "justice" and a fair distribution 
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of social benefits. 
The examination and the proposed study which follows 
attempts to accomplish two things. First, by investigating 
what nonviolence is and how it works it is hoped that dis-
crete variables can be isolated which will provide for a 
more precise explanation of its efficacy than the humanistic 
and philosophical accounts of its power. Second, this 
research seeks to translate those variables into an appro-
priate experimental design to test and verify the apparent 
causal relationships. Hopefully, such an investigation 
will add to the general body of knowledge concerning not 
only nonviolence as a strategy of conflict but also those 
forces which underlie conflict and the processes of social 
influence. 
Nonviolence: 
A Strategy of Protest 
Before proceeding further, we need to define the 
strategy of nonviolence. Thus far we have discussed non-
violence as if there were general agreement as to its 
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nature. Regrettably, this is not the case. Gene Sharp, 
after extensive research, has identified nine different and 
distinct types of nonviolence. 12 These types of nonviolence 
vary along several dimensions including the scope of accept-
able consequences, the techniques or means employed (coercive 
or persuasive), and the motives which inform the act 
(morality and/or expediency). 
For the purposes of this study we will attempt to 
provide a definition of nonviolence which is consistent with 
most of the orientations which exist by abstracting out 
those elements which are essential to general acceptance. 
The definition and characteristics which follow represent an 
operational definition which focuses primarily on what those 
who engage in nonviolent action do, as opposed to identifying 
motives and beliefs which stand behind those actions. 
First and foremost, advocates of nonviolence reject the 
threat£!:~ of physical force against persons or their 
property.13 The justification for this rejection may be 
either moral or pragmatic, but it is a clear characteristic 
that nonviolence, categorically, excludes the use of 
violence under any circumstances. 
However, there are some who believe that the implicit 
threat (potential) of violence, should demands go unheeded, 
and the fear associated with this does serve to motivate 
elements of the opposition to negotiate. 14 Others believe 
that any allusion to the use of violence in response to 
opposition action will only serve to legitimize repressive 
measures, strengthen the opposition's resolve, and alienate 
possible supporters. In addition, violent action on the 
part of protesters may violate certain values held by the 
movement concerning the moral superiority of its methods 
and its demands.15 
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A second characteristic is that protest behavior is not 
considered "nonviolent" unless the action occurs in a 
context wherein a violent response would be considered not 
only appropriate but, an expected response. 16 This consider-
ation excludes a wide range of behavior which might be 
associated with normal decision-making processes and focuses 
on the more extreme forms of social conflict. 
Two implications are particularly important here. 
First, nonviolent action implies restraint and self-control: 
refraining from the expected use of violence; refusing to 
"play the game" by the opposition's rules. Second, this 
violation of the opponent's expectations is an essential 
ingredient in the potential success of the strategy. Refus-
ing to do what the opposition expects or wants serves to 
create an atmosphere of uncertainty which, hopefully, can be 
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exploited by the protesters. The violation of expectations 
enables them to enact, and possibly gain acceptance of, a 
new set of social norms that will provide the structure 
necessary to reduce uncertainty and restabilize the system. 
A third dimension of nonviolence as a strategy of 
social protest is the means or techniques employed. Here 
the question centers on the 'legitimacy of using coercion in 
concert with persuasion. Some advocates clearly reject 
coercion as an appropriate means of bringing about social 
change. Their tendency is to rely solely on persuasion as 
a mechanism of change. This rejection tends to be predicated 
on the assumption that coercive techniques, insofar as they 
bring about physical or psychological hardship, are violent. 17 
The difficulty with this position is twofold. First, 
even attempts at persuasion may bring about intense psycho-
' 
logical discomfort. Second, since persuasion can induce, 
psychological distress and "hardship": how does one assess 
the real or potential intensity which a persuasive attempt 
engenders? Without knowing in advance the potential hard-
ship that persuasive attempts may have, one cannot determine 
whether or not it is an appropriate tactic. 
The question then becomes, "where does one draw the 
line?" It is easier to draw the line at clearly observable 
physical actions than hidden, internal, psychological states. 
Those coercive techniques which do not employ physical force 
to injure or harm others are considered acceptable tactics 
by most advocates of nonviolence.18 
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The inclusion of limited coercive means seems to be 
supported by a majority of nonviolent activists. Of the 
nine types of nonviolence identified by Sharp, seven clear-
ly advocate the use of coercion as a mechanism of social 
change. 1 9 This includes Gandhi's "Satyagraha" and King's 
"Peaceful Resistance". In fact, for most of these advocates, 
the coercive elements of the strategy are at least equally, 
if not more, important than the persuasive dimension. 
Consequently, for our purposes here, both coercive and 
persuasive techniques will be considered legitimate parts of 
nonviolence. 
Finally, it is essential that nonviolence be recognized 
as a strategy of social protest. There are two ways to look 
at the question of "strategy": as a practitioner or the 
theoretician. Where the practitioner is concerned with the 
efficient application of a set of tactics, the theoretician 
is concerned with accounting for and explaining the whole 
range of possible applications and potential consequences. 
The one perspective is concerned with results; the other, 
with explanation. 
The perspective adopted for this study is that of the 
theoretician. Implicit in this view is the assumption that 
the best course of action is contingent upon the behavior 
of the other. Taking a "strategic perspective" assumes an 
interdependence between the adversaries' decisions and 
expectations which govern each other's behavior. 20 One's 
choice of action depends upon what (s)he expects the other 
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to do in response. This dependence can set up a self-
fulfilling prophecy which reinforces the status quo, or it 
can provide an avenue for social influence and social change. 
Nonviolent activists believe that social expectations and 
interdependence can be exploited to produce change. 
An examination of social protest centers on attempts by 
those outside the normal decision-making process to influence 
community decisions and social structure. Consequently, 
attempts at social influence which exist within the establish-
ment will not be examined. The concern here is with issues 
raised by elements of the community which exist outside the 
power-structure: those who have, in the past, had little 
control over the decisions which shape their destinies--e.g. 
women, blacks, the poor, etc. This examination focuses on 
the collective, public, active attempts at social influence 
engaged in by the disenfranchised, the disinherited, and 
the dispossessed. 
Nonviolent direct action is not a particularly new 
strategy, but never before has it assumed such popularity as 
a means for bringing about social change. At no time before 
its implementation by Gandhi in India or King in America had 
it been the dominant strategy for mass protest. Violence 
seemed to be the accepted means for settling social disputes. 
Violent coercion was standard procedure. In fact, there are 
many people, both past and present, who scoff at the idea 
that nonviolence can prove an effective means of waging 
conflict. For example, Marxist philosophies argue that 
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violent revolution is an inevitable aspect of social change. 
However, there are those who have successfully argued for, 
and demonstrated, the practical and psychological advantages 
of a nonviolent approach to conflict. For this reason alone, 
nonviolence merits close examination. 
12 
Nonviolence: 
A Mechanism for Change 
Nonviolence is a strategy of protest employed by the 
weak and disenfranchised to effect a change in their status. 
Its efficacy is predicated upon certain fundamental assump-
tions about the structuring and conduct of human relation-
ships. Kenneth Boulding speaks of all social systems as 
being composed of three distinct yet interrelated components: 
the exchange system, the threat system, and the normative 
system. 21 The exchange system corresponds to inducements 
and promises which establish mutual expectations and 
obligations. The threat system consists of coercive actions 
which serve to deter or compel certain actions on the part 
of others. 22 The integrative system represents those 
normative and moral considerations which serve to legitimize 
or condemn the actions of the parties to the system. 
Advocates of nonviolence work from the premise that 
human association, organization, and differentiation is 
based upon a complex process of exchange. Nonviolent 
protesters seek to manipulate the social system by dramatiz-
ing the basic interdependence of the system's members, 
restructuring social perceptions, and reintegrating the 
system along a new line of norms, while at the same time 
trying to minimize the reactionary efforts and the use of 
threats (coercive and repressive action) by the dominant 
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members of the system. 
People come together because they are attracted by the 
prospect of meeting needs and gaining benefits through social 
interaction.23 If these social transactions are to be main-
tained, and perhaps grow, then all parties involved must be 
satisfied with the derived benefits. However, the exchange 
of commodities and services is seldom equitable, leading to 
an imbalance of exchange. The party who cannot match the 
benefits bestowed upon him by another becomes obligated and 
dependent upon the other. This inequity or imbalance 
confers power on the dominant member over the actions of the 
dependent member. The greater the imbalance in exchange the 
greater the obligation and the greater the power of the 
dominant party. 
Balanced relationships are fairly stable. Imbalanced 
transactions are inherently unstable, generating pressures 
toward the creation of a more equitable exchange. However, 
as long as the relationship and the demands imposed by the 
more powerful are perceived as legitimate, there will be 
little pressure to change the system. If, at some time, the 
inequities of the transaction should be viewed as illegiti-
mate or exploitative, unrest and agitation for change are 
likely to result. 
The form which this agitation takes will be affected 
by the disparity which exists between the power of the 
dominant and the dependent. The greater the disparity, the 
weaker the dependent, and the less likely the prospects for 
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successful agitation. Further, the greater the weakness of 
the protesters the more likely they are to rely upon violence 
as a strategy of change; moving outside the exchange 
relationship to apply coercive pressure through threats. 
However, advocates of nonviolence argue that the appli-
cation of violence is the worst possible alternative.24 
They claim many disadvantages to the use of violent protest. 
The use of violence not only invites but justifies aggres-
sive and violent repression by the agents of social control. 
Consequently, the use of violence may end up causing more 
harm to the protesters than the status quo. Thus, increased 
potential for harm has a tendency to reduce the number of 
I 
resisters and weaken the movement. 
Furthermore, the use of violence by protestors is hard 
to justify. Violence, as a mechanism to force change, is 
seldom considered a legitimate means of bringing about a 
desired end. Because of this, violence tends to strengthen 
the opposition, scaring off potential supporters and 
sympathizers. Finally, and perhaps most important, violence 
creates a defensive and closed psychological climate, inhib-
iting the desire for creative problem-solving. 
On the other hand, they claim that nonviolence results 
in several strategic advantages. 25 A nonviolent approach to 
social change creates a real problem for the power-dominant. 
It becomes increasingly diffic~lt for agents of social 
control to justify the use of violence and repressive 
measures in the face of a nonviolent counter action. Repres-
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sive and violent action taken against nonviolent protesters 
may alienate the general population and members of the 
opposition from the opponent's camp. By contrast the 
opponent's tactics appear dispicable and unjust. Nonviolence 
gives the protester a "moral" advantage, increasing the 
number of protesters and rallying public opinion. But, 
perhaps most important, continued and sustained resistance 
on the part of the nonviolent protester in the face of 
violence and repression on the part of the power-dominant 
demonstrates that the protesters are immune to threat and 
cannot be cowed. Eventually, the power-dominant's ability 
or will to continue will be successfully undermined. How-
ever, nonviolent activists experience difficulty in maintain-
ing "continued and sustained resistance." Herein lies its 
major limitation. 
' Regardless of what advocates claim•about the strategic 
superiority of nonviolence, its psychological and/or moral 
advantages, those employing nonviolence have little chance 
for success. The major obstacle confronting the nonviolent 
protester is that (s)he has few resources with which to with-
stand the pressure brought to bear by the opposition. The 
opposition simply has greater resources, better organization 
and~ power than the nonviolent protester. Insofar as 
the goal of the agitation is to create a bargaining 
situation, the protesters must somehow reduce the disparity 
in the power relationship. Dialogue and creative problem-
solving will occur only between those who are functionally 
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equal. Nonviolent protesters must raise the costs of social 
control and containment to such a level that negotiation and 
appeasement become desirable alternatives. 
Let me summarize by saying that nonviolence is a 
strategy which seeks to disrupt social transactions in an 
effort to dramatize and alter perceived inequities. However, 
since those who seek to change the status quo are weak their 
ability to create sufficient disruption to cause the 
opposition to negotiate a new system of exchange is severely 
limited. Consequently, nonviolent protesters seek to 
enhance their power position by forming a coalition with 
other interested parties. Direct confrontation of the power-
dominant without aid of an interested third party is doomed. 
The power-dominant, with greater resources and reserves, 
need only "wait out" the protesters in order) to reassert his 
dominance. 
Advocates of nonviolence believe that concessions can 
be gained by focusing attention on the basic interdependence 
of the parties involved through acts of noncooperation and 
civil disobedience. 26 Even though one party may be more 
powerful, it has need of and has come to depend on the 
compliance of the other. Certain expectations and obligations 
have emerged over time which define the proper order of things. 
" As long as the power-dependent comply with those expectations 
and obligations there is little impetus for change. 
However, noncompliance violates expectations and creates 
uncertainty. If noncooperation can be sustained long enough, 
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it can leave the opposition open to the imposition of a new, 
more "equitable" exchange structure. Significant disruption 
of the social system opens the way for the negotiation of 
normative prescriptions and exchange ratios which will allow 
the system to proceed again. Nonviolent protesters seek to 
create a controlled disruption and invoke superordinant 
values which define a new and proper exchange relationship. 
Continued and sustained resistance can occur only if 
the protest~rs can create an ideology which elevates the 
value of self-sacrifice and conduct themselves in such a 
way as to gain the support of powerful others. As Oberschall 
indicates, "nonviolence is not likely to be successful 
unless there exists third parties or an independent public 
opinion whose support can be mobilized and who in turn will 
bring pressure to bear on the agents of social control and 
the governrnent.27 
Noncooperat:1.on arm~ivi-1-d-±sobed±-ence-a-r-e---e-ae-e--i~s 
employed within the larger strategy of coalition. Noncooper-
ation is directed, primarily, at the exchange relationship: 
relying upon the withdrawal of the material or labor contri-
bution of the protesters. Civil disobedience is, essentially, 
a moral weapon; a symbolic act of confrontation intended to 
force consideration of dominance relations in the full light 
of public opinion. This dichotomy may very well be an over-
simplification of the focus of these two tactics, but it does 
serve to direct attention on the two essential dimensions of 
the nonviolent strategy: noncooperation and moral persuasion. 
Both noncooperation and civil disobedience may be 
disruptive, however, without widespread exposure and 
publicity they can easily be dealt with by the authorities 
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as criminal acts, routine deviance not worthy of considera-
tion. Nonviolent protest needs access to media and publicity. 
The more massive and the publicized the nonviolent action 
is, the greater the embarrassment of the authorities becomes. 
Massive and widespread social disruption brands the dominant's 
claim "to rule based upon the consent of the governed" as a 
fraud. 28 The cloak of legitimacy has been stripped away. 
The formation of coalitions, so necessary for the 
success of a nonviolent movement, may proceed along one or 
both of two lines: economic {exchange) or normative {moral). 
If there exists an exchange relationship between the protes-
ters and the third party, the protesters may make any future 
exchange contingent upon the third parties support and 
cooperation. Normative alliances may be formed through the 
dramatization of shared values and social expectations 
concerning a "just world." Normative appeals become moral 
persuasion; relying upon shared and/or superordinant values 
to reintegrate and redefine the social system. 
Even though both the economic and the normative 
dimensions of social interaction may result in an alteration 
of the status quo, I believe that economic or exchange 
concerns, representing the foundation of social relationships, 
are more basic and carry greater weight. This is not to say 
that people cannot or do not act upon principle in the face 
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of real or perceived harm to their exchange interests, but, 
rather, that moral action is impeded or reinforced by 
existing exchange relationships. Consequently, the ability 
of protesters to develop coalitions with powerful third . 
parties is contingent upon the existing exchange relation-
ships between the third parties and the conflicting parties. 
There would appear to be at least four possible relationships 
between the third party and the conflict participants. 
First, the third party may have direct economic 
(exchange) ties with the power-dominant (opposition). Such 
a condition would pose considerable difficulties for the 
protester. In such a situation the protester would have to 
rely upon superordinant or shared values to motivate the 
third party to act in a manner contradictory to his economic 
(basic security) interests. An example of such a condition 
might be America's relationship to South Africa. Our moral 
commitment to civil rights runs counter to our need for 
certain commodities or services, such as weapons grade 
uranium or the need for a strong anti-Soviet ally, which 
South Africa supplies and which are believed to be essential 
to our economic and national security. America's involve-
ment with Israel may represent a case where value identi-
fication has supremacy over economic dependence. Even though 
.America has a strong dependence on Arab oil, we still provide 
economic and military aid to Israel. This aid has resulted 
in a military equality that seems to have led to negotiations 
as a method of resolving the conflict. Because of recent 
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price increases and the threat of an oil embargo one can see 
how economic dependence has influenced the kind of support 
that the third party is willing to give. 
The second type of relationship is where the third 
party is "economically" linked to the power-dependent 
(protester). In this situation both economic and normative 
justifications can be raised to induce the third party to 
support the protesters. The normative and exchange processes 
reinforce and strengthen one another. An example of such a 
relationship may be the coalition of black voters and the 
federal government during the civil rights agitation of the 
60's. Blacks exchanged votes for federal support of civil 
rights legislation. 
A third type of situation exists where the third party 
is not linked to one side or the other but, rather, to the 
continued functioning of the system. In such a case 
economic disruption may be a cause of concern for the third 
party but will not necessarily influence the direction of its 
support or intervention. When economic or exchange pres-
sures are neutral or balanced, moral or normative consider-
ations will take on more importance as a basis (perhaps the 
sole basis) for making a decision about the direction and 
kind of support given by the third party. If, for example, 
during the Iranian revolution the U.S. believed its economic 
or security interests would not be jeopardized by a new 
Islamic government then a decision about who to support and 
how much support to give may have been conditioned by issues 
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of "civil rights" rather than concern over its exchange 
interests. As long as we perceived little threat to our 
national security the U.S. probably experienced little con-
cern over who actually controlled the country or the oil 
production. 
The fourth and final relationship may be somewhat rare. 
This is the situation where the economic interests are non-
existent or minimal. The third party is not dependent on 
the antagonists in any meaningful way. In this case purely 
moral considerations are likely to control the actions of 
the third party. The intervention of the Arab League in the 
conflict between North and South Yemen may be an example of 
this situation. Presumably, certain normative concerns over 
Arab solidarity motivated the intervention of the league. 
It is conceivable that in each of these situations the 
interaction of disruption, economic and moral appeal, and 
the strategic approach employed (violent versus nonviolent) 
will lead to differing outcomes and variable success for the 
power-dependent. Nonviolence relies upon the disruption of 
the exchange system and the imposition of certain normative 
(moral) axioms to coerce the opposition into accepting a 
negotiated settlement. Hopefully, such a settlement will 
lead to greater gains for the power-dependent and a more 
stable relationship. The efficacy of noncompliance and moral 
appeals will be enhanced or inhibited by the exchange relation-
ship that exists between the third party and the parties to 
the conflict. It is further expected that when nonviolent 
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and violent strategies are compared within situations that 
have similar exchange relationships that, due to its "moral" 
superiority, the nonviolent strategy will lead to better 
outcomes and a greater willingness on the part of the third 
party to intervene on behalf of the nonviolent protester. 
I propose that nonviolence as a strategy of social pro-
test is an interesting and valuable subject for study. 
Whereas there has been considerable philosophical and spec-
ulative analysis of nonviolence, there has been little 
systematic empirical/experimental analysis. Nonviolence 
represents an area of study which asks how the weak and 
dependent can take charge of their own destiny, bring about 
fundamental social change, while at the same time minimizing 
the destructive and dehumanizing tendencies of intense social 
conflict. 
The study of nonviolence is an apt subject for the field 
of communication because it focuses attention on the organiz-
ing and integrating properties of interaction. Nonviolent 
protesters must alter perceptions and redefine social 
relationships. This is accomplished by articulating and 
dramatizing the fundamental disparity between the way things 
are and the way things should be; by presenting a new vision 
with such force that it becomes compelling. 
Further, nonviolence is in need of study because past 
research has failed to adequately and clearly identify the 
bases for its efficacy. A complete study of nonviolence 
needs to consider carefully exchange relationships, 
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normative appeals and the deterent capabilities of the 
opposition. Initially, there is the need to focus clearly 
upon the exchange relationship as the foundation upon which 
the strategy stands or falls. Ultimately, the key to an 
understanding of nonviolence can be found in a thorough 
examination of the relationship between conflict, power, and 
communication. 
Preview 
This chapter has presented a general framework and 
rationale for the study of nonviolence. This discussion has 
been based upon the work of activists and scholars who have 
spent considerable time examining, speculating, and testing 
the strategy in an effort to better understand and implement 
the str~tegy. The next chapter examines experimental 
research relevant to the study of nonviolence with the goal 
of developing useful hypotheses for the further study of this 
strategy. Chapter three will present a research methodology 
designed to test several hypotheses concerning the efficacy 
of nonviolence. Chapter four will present the results of 
this research and chapter five will consist of a discussion 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a review of experimental research 
relevant to nonviolence as a strategy for conflict. The 
research reviewed is limited to those studies which have 
specifically investigated the efficacy of different strategies 
at inducing cooperation. Some of these strategies are quite 
similar to the concept of "nonviolence" presented in the first 
chapter. All of these studies provide some relevant impli-
cations for an understanding of nonviolence and how it works 
as a strategy. 
Fixed Strategies 
Several researchers have sought to influence the overall 
level of cooperation in a conflict (game) by altering the 
level of cooperation in the strategy employed by one of the 
participants. The level of cooperation in the strategy 
employed by one of the participants. The level of cooperation 
was preplanned and not contingent upon the choices of the 
other player, hence the concept of fixed strategy. The 
general expectation seems to have been that a strategy with 
a high level of cooperation will elicit more cooperation 




A cooperative choice is one which serves to maximize the 
joint payoffs and to minimize any differential rewards be-
tween players. For example, given a payoff matrix like the 
one below (fig.2-1), a cooperative choice for player 1 
would be the C1 regardless of what player 2 chose. The 
assessment of overall levels of cooperation is predicated 
upon player 2's responses; c2 being a cooperative choice and 






(Fig. 2-1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix) 
The first set of fixed strategy studies have compared 
100% cooperative choices with 100% competitive (0% coopera-
tive) choices. In other words, the ratio of cooperative (C) 
choices to competitive (D) choices is fixed at 100% coopera-
tive or 100% competitive. The results of these studies tend 
to suggest that a 100% cooperative strategy will elicit 
greater levels of cooperation from an opponent than a 100% 
competitive strategy. 2 However, even though the 100% 
cooperative strategies elicited greater levels of coopera-
tion, those levels were not exceptionally high. Wilson 
achieved levels of 56% cooperation as compared to 6% for 
pure competitive strategies.3 Sermat achieved levels of 
cooperation of 40% for the cooperative strategy but only 15% 
for the competitive strategy.4 Lave achieved the highest 
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levels of cooperation with 90% for the cooperative strategy 
and 28% for the competitive strategy. 5 
Another series of fixed strategy studies varied the 
percentage of cooperative choices and found the higher the 
percentage of cooperation, the greater the overall level of 
cooperation manifested by the opponent.6 For example, 
Whitworth and Lucker found that a 90% cooperative strategy 
was more effective at inducing the other player to choose 
cooperatively (52%) than a 10% cooperative strategy (31%).7 
Other studies have compared mixes of 50% cooperative choices 
versus 10% cooperative choices8 and 50% cooperative vs. 25% 
vs. 0%. 9 
There are two general problems with these studies. 
First, the overall levels of "cooperation" obtained were not 
particularly high, seldom over 50%. Second, many of these 
studies failed to report the significance achieved, so 
conclusions and claims based upon these studies lack 
probative force. Even with these limitations these studies 
tend to suggest a limited form of reciprocity; cooperation 
elicited cooperation. 
Contingent Strategies 
Another type of strategy examined is the contingent or 
matching strategy. With this approach the experimenter 
matches the choices made by the subject. This matching is 
either simultaneous, each choosing at the same time, with 
matching occurring on the next trial, or choices are 
sequential, where the subject chooses first on every trial 
and the accomplice chooses second, but always choosing the 
same as the subject. 
30 
The method of matching has two implications for the 
interpretation of the results. Johnson argues that the 
sequential play is a "clearer" method where the subject can 
readily determine the relationship between his choice and 
the other player's choice. Simultaneous play is less clear. 
The subject is not able to clearly identify the causes of 
the other player's choice behavior.lo The supposition here 
is that the "order of choice" may influence the subject's 
interpretation of the game situation and, consequently, 
influence his/her game behavior differentially. 
The second implication has to do with the perceived 
power of the two parties. Oskamp indicates that the diff~r-
ences achieved with sequential play are greater than with 
simultaneous play.11 His contention is that the order of 
choice confers greater power on the one who chooses second. 
The one who chooses last has a greater potential to influence 
the outcomes of the other by virtue of his greater knowledge. 
Consequently, the research cited here may be subject to some 
significant and unaccounted for order effects. With this 
caution in mind let us turn to the findings of these studies. 
Contingent strategies, also called matching or tit-for-
tat (TFT), employ a firm principle of reciprocity. If the 
first player chooses cooperatively, then the second player 
chooses likewise. If the first player chooses competitively, 
then the second player chooses competitively. In other 
words, the second player's choices are contingent upon and 
match the choices of the first player. 
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Crumbaugh and Evans and Wilson, employing simultaneous 
choices, found the matching strategy elicited more coopera-
tion than a 0% cooperative strategy; 54% vs. 40% and 52% vs. 
6%, respectively. 12 Solomon employing the sequential choice 
method found similar results.13 
Comparisons of the contingent strategy with a 100% 
cooperative strategy have shown mixed results. Solomon, 
employing sequential choices, found the matching strategy 
more effective (69% vs. 29%) while Wilson, using simultaneous 
play, found the matching strategy less than or equal to the 
100% cooperative strategy (52% vs. 59%).14 A study by 
Oskamp and Perlman produced results similar to the Wilson 
results. 15 Here, as suggested earlier, the results may be 
more a product of the order of choosing than the strategy 
employed. If the sequential method is clearer and more 
powerful, one would expect these kind of results. 
A number of other studies have shown the contingent 
strategy to elicit more overall cooperation than freeplay. 
Pilisuk, Skolnick and Overstreet; Pilisuk and Skolnick; and 
Oskamp all found a matching strategy to produce significantly 
more cooperation than game situations where subjects played 
with no preplanned programs. 16 However, Oskamp and Perlman 
found no significant difference between freeplay and matching 
strategies.17 In fact, the freeplay condition in the Oskamp 
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and Perlman study overall level of cooperation of 75% where 
the contingent condition elicited only 50% cooperation. 
One explanation for these results may stem from the order 
effects derived from simultaneous choices employed by 
Oskamp and Perlman. 
Wilson employed variations of a contingent strategy 
which he called coaxing and retaliatory strategies.18 These 
strategies were conceived as a compromise between a 
~ 
competitive strategy, which'obscured one's desire to cooper-
ate, and a cooperative strategy that rewarded double-crossing. 
The coaxing and retaliatory strategies differed from a 
consistent matching strategy which was thought to lead to 
"locking-in" effects. 1 9 Wilson found the matching strategy 
elicited more cooperation than either the coaxing or the 
retaliatory strategies. 2 0 A study by Bixenstine and Gaebelein 
found that a matching strategy that was slow to retaliate 
(similar to Wilson's coaxing strategy) produced greater 
levels of cooperation than a competitive strategy. 21 
The findings related to the contingent or matching 
strategies suggest that where parties to a conflict have the 
ability to adjust their choices to the moves of the other 
cooperation is enhanced. It may be that the contingent 
strategy "forces" the other to recognize the value of 
cooperation to achieve the maximization of long term gains. 
All other strategies rewarded competitive behavior to greater 
or lesser degrees. It roust also be kept in mind that the 
power invested in the players was relatively equal. 
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Implications 
The strategy of nonviolence might be likened to the 
contingent strategies examined in these studies. Nonviolent 
activists make their cooperation contingent upon the actions 
and choices of the other. When compared to the fixed 
strategies the contingent strategy consistently elicited 
\ 
greater cooperation, given sequential choices. This suggests 
that a "nonviolent" approach should be more effective than 
a "violent" approach (contingent vs. competitive) at inducing 
cooperation. However, the nonviolent situation does not 
match the Prisoner's Dilemma situation exactly. In the PD 
game players have equal power, and given the sequential 
choices the confederate may have had greater power. Such is 
not the case with nonviolence. 
Strategy Shifts 
Another area of study has dealt with changes in strategy 
that occur during the play of the game. Mcclintock, Gallo 
and Harrison examined the impact of a shift in opponent's 
strategy on subjects identified as having an orientation 
described as either "internationalist" or "isolationist. 1122 
Subjects who were internationalists were found to be more 
sensitive and responsive to shifts in strategy than 
isolationists. When the internationalist was confronted with 
a cooperative strategy in the first half of game play, he 
reciprocated with cooperative behavior during the 2nd half 
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of play; when confronted with competition, he responded 
competitively. No significant differences in response were 
found for the isolationist. 23 
Swingle found that subjects' reactions to a shift in 
strategy tended to vary with their initial orientation. 24 
Subjects who approached the conflict from a highly competi-
tive orientation became more cooperative when confronted with 
a shift to a more competitive strategy. Highly cooperative 
subjects responded competitively, retaliating quickly and 
severely when the opponents strategy shifted to a more 
competitive approach. 
Swingle also found that shifting strategies from an 
initially 5% to a 95% cooperative strategy elicited more 
cooperation than a fixed strategy of 95% cooperation (34% 
vs. 24%) •25 Unfortunately, the effects were not significant. 
Swingle and Coady also failed to find significance when 
comparing a shifting strategy of 4% to 96% cooperation with 
a fixed strategy of 96%. 26 Scodel, on the other hand, did 
find a significant difference when comparing a shifting 
strategy of 0% to 100% with a 100% cooperative strategy. 27 
A sudden shift from low to high cooperation elicited more 
cooperation than a consistently high cooperative strategy. 
Changes from highly cooperative to highly competitive 
choices either failed to achieve significance or the results 
were uninterpretable given the reported findings. 28 
The reformed sinner strategy produced greater levels of 
cooperation than did the lapsed saint within the first 20 
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trials after the shift. When the matching strategy was 
continued beyond this point the levels of cooperation 
converged. 30 Studies by Oskamp and Sermat showed that the 
long term (over 60 trials) concurrent effects of the match-
ing strategy overrode the delayed effects of both the re-
formed sinner and the lapsed saint.31 
Sermat found that pretreatment with cooperative or 
competitive strategies which were then followed by a matching 
strategy (simultaneous choices) yielded a significant increase 
in the levels of cooperative choices by the subject.3 2 This 
"pretreatment" seems akin to the reformed sinner and the 
lapsed saint strategies. 
Comparisons between the reformed sinner or lapsed saint 
strategies and a contingent strategy have provided no 
reliable results. Studies by Harford and Hill, Sermat and 
Crumbaugh and Evans have resulted in findings of no signifi-
cance.33 Results discovered by Harford and Solomon indicated 
that both the lapsed saint and the reformed sinner produced 
significantly more cooperation than the contingent strategy. 34 
Implications 
Consider for a moment the relationship between the 
participants in a conflict where nonviolence is advocated. 
The parties are not of equal power, and their relationship 
has been characterized by a period of cooperative behavior. 
Suddenly the power-less participant shifts to a competitive 
or contingent strategy (it seems likely that the opponent 
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would see only the competitive nature of the resistance). 
Within this context, the nonviolent strategy would resemble 
the lapsed saint. Given equal power conditions the lapsed 
saint was not very effective at eliciting cooperation; at 
least, it was not as effective as the reformed sinner. It 
seems reasonable to assume that given less power it would be 
even less effective. 
The Quality of Strategy Shifts 
Teger found that the impact of abrupt shifts in strategy 
varied with the size of the hostile act. When a hostile re-
action was preceded by cooperation it was perceived as being 
more hostile and evoked stronger retaliation than when there 
was no prior cooperation. The size and strength of the 
retaliation was reduced when the hostile act was small. 35 
In a related study Bixenstein and Gaebelein found that a 
strategy that was slow to reciprocate competitive behavior 
was most effective at inducing cooperation. 36 
A study by Gruder and Duslak reports similar results.37 
They hypothesized that a player programmed to respond to 
exploitation (competitive choices) with mildly retaliatory 
resistance would be more effective in eliciting the subject's 
cooperation than would players programmed with either 
strongly retaliatory or nonretaliatory strategies. 38 Their 
results confirmed this hypothesis. It also demonstrated 
that both the low retaliatory and high retaliatory strategies 
produced more cooperation than did no retaliation. 
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This study differs from those cited previously on two 
critical points. First, the confederate had a third choice 
while the subject did not. All previous studies employed 
the prisoner's dilemma game where the number of choices were 
the same. Second, because of this third choice, the confed-
erate had more power to influence the outcomes of the subject. 
What is interesting to note is that the greater the power, 
the more competitive the subjects played. Perhaps less 
intense responses were perceived as more "legitimate" and, 
hence, did not provoke strong resistance. 
Implications 
The Gruder and Duslak study has significant implications 
for the qualitative difference between violent and nonviolent 
strategies. Consider that violence would constitute a highly 
retaliatory strategy where the nonviolent strategy would re-
present low retaliation. Whereas both produced more cooper-
ation than did no retaliation (100% cooperation), the low 
retaliatory strategy produced more cooperation than did the· 
highly retaliatory strategy. Unfortunately, this occurred 
in a context of greater power for the confederate as 
agitator or protester; a condition not indicative of a 
nonviolent situation. The Bixenstine and Gaebelin study 
also suggests that a strategy which is slow to reciprocate 
competitive behaviors (retaliate) was most effective at 
eliciting cooperative behavior from an opponent. 
Place both of these studies within the context of the 
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Teger findings, and they assume new significance. Consider 
that the less powerful participant has "cooperated" for some 
time prior to effecting a change. The fact that he agitates 
for change is going to elicit retaliation. However, the 
perceived magnitude of his hostile behavior will effect the 
intensity of the other's retaliation. Nonviolence might be 
conceived of as a small hostile act and result in milder 
retaliation. Violence would clearly be viewed as a large 
hostile act and provoke stronger retaliation. The Teger 
study also serves to reinforce the observations that the 
"oppressor" almost universally responds with repressive 
measures when confronted with resistance. 
Strategy and Power Relationships 
It has been stated several times in this review that 
the PD game involves a relationship of equal power and that 
this is not representative of a nonviolent situation. So far 
all of the research on "strategy" has focused on equal power 
or superior power situations. In other words, researchers 
have examined the impact of various strategies on subjects 
who have had equal power or less power than their opponent. 
From the perspective of nonviolence there is need to examine 
the impact of various strategies as used by the less powerful 
to influence the more powerful. However, current research 
on power relationships may provide some useful insights. 
Deutsch and Solomon have both examined the efficacy of 
different strategies at inducing individualistically oriented 
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opponents to cooperate. 39 Solomon's study is a follow-up 
on Deutsch's and, consequently, they both employ the same 
manipulations. The essential question they asked was, "how 
would subjects in different power positions respond to 
variations in strategies as enacted by their opponents?" 
Four power conditions were employed. Power condition 
one (PCl) placed the opponent (0) in a position of absolute 
power over the subject; however, O was provided with no 
incentive to compete. Power condition 2 (PC2) also placed 0 
in a position of absolute power, but now O has an incentive 
to choose competitively. Power condition 3 (PC3) provided 
the subject (S) with some power to influence the outcomes 
of O; S being able to reduce O's net gain but not able to 
cause a loss. Power condition 4 (PC4) placed Sand O in 
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The three strategies employed were: 1. Unconditional 
cooperation (benevolent)-- O makes a cooperative choice (A) 
on every trial regardless of S's choice; 2. Conditional 
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cooperation (benevolent)-- O makes a cooperative choice (A) 
on the first trial and matches S's choices from then on; 
e. Noncooperation (unconditionally malevolent)-- O makes a 
competitive choice (B) on every trial regardless of S's 
choice. 
In both studies S's were instructed to approach the 
game individualistically; pursuing their own best interests 
regardless of the rewards gained by the other player. After 
five trials in the Deutsch study and after six trials in the 
Solomon study S's reversed positions with O for one trial. 
The results of both studies followed the same general 
pattern. S's responded more competitively the greater the 
disparity with respect to power. S's tended to respond more 
cooperatively when O had little incentive to deal with them 
competitively. Where subjects were exposed to a cooperative 
strategy they tended to both trust and like O more than when 
confronted with a competitive strategy. The conditionally 
cooperative strategy was most effective at eliciting cooper-
ation in the equal power condition (as reported by Solomon). 
S's tended to respond to unconditional cooperation in the 
equal power condition with highly competitive behavior. 40 
Deutsch, focusing on the partial power condition (PC3) found 
almost the same results. 
Implications 
Once again it seems that the conditional or matching 
strategy has been shown to be superior. However, beyond 
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this these studies have little to offer for an examination 
of nonviolence. The crucial limitation of these studies is 
that the strategies were employed by the power-full party. 
What this does serve to do, however, is justify the need for 
the present study into the impact of strategies used by the 
power-less. 
These studies also serve to point out the need for a 
relatively equal basis of power. All of the PD studies are 
by definition, games of equal power. Under conditions of 
equal power even the unconditionally cooperative strategies 
have been shown to elicit moderate levels of cooperation. 
The major question now is whether these same strategies would 
prove equally effective if employed by the power-less member 
when the opponent knows they have the advantage. 
It can also be argued that even though levels of 
cooperation were moderate, the opposition still exploited 
the cooperative tendencies of the other player. As long as 
this "exploitation" was within reasonable bounds, i.e .. 
legitimate, the behavior was not seen as "exploitative." 
Or perhaps, the competitive behavior of the opposition 
would have been seen as "exploitative" had the researchers 
assumed the perspective of the confederate. In other words, 
if a naive subject had played a purely cooperative strategy 
and had been subjected to the same kind of competitive 
behavior demonstrated in these studies, would the naive 
subject perceive that behavior as exploitive? As the 
subjects in the Deutsch and Solomon studies reported, they 
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disliked the competitive player more and trusted them less 
than the more cooperative players. Does this suggest that 
they felt exploited? Unfortunately, no answers have been 
provided. 
The entire issue of the impact of power relationships 
takes on special significance when it is remembered that 
competitive behavior in equal power conditions evoked highly 
competitive responses. Acts perceived as noncooperative 
employed by the power-less would certainly elicit the same 
if not more severe kind of response. Furthermore, in light 
of the research by Teger and Gruder and Duslak it seems most 
likely that there would be an even more intense response. 
So far there has been no research that has assumed the 
perspective of the power-dependent with respect to the 
implementation of different strategies. 
Motivational Orientation 
An area highly related to the impact or choice of 
strategy is the motivational orientation of the subject. 
The motivational orientation reflects an attitude assumed 
by the subject concerning the extent to which his/her 
rewards are linked to the choices of the other. The conflict 
situations investigated here are mixed motive, which means 
that there exists both cooperative and competitive incen-
tives. Participants may perceive that cooperative incen-
tives dominate, competitive incentives dominate, or may 
perceive themselves to be relatively independent of the 
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other. 
It was mentioned earlier that Mcclintock, Gallo and 
Harrison found subjects who were "internationalists" were 
more sensitive to shifts in strategy than "isolationists," 
and Swingle found that a subject's reaction to a shift in 
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strategy varied according to a measure of their initial 
competitiveness. 42 Both of these studies suggest that a 
subject's initial orientation to the conflict will influence 
his/her perceptions of the other's behavior and consequently, 
his/her response. 
Deutsch conducted one of the earliest studies on the 
impact of motivational orientations on the level of 
cooperation experienced in a conflict. 43 Subjects were given 
instructions which described the manner in which they should 
approach the game. In the cooperative orientation they were 
instructed that concern should be given to mutual gain and 
that the other player felt the same way. They were led to 
believe that cooperation was the best way to maximize their 
gains. The individualistic orientation conveyed to subjects 
that they should seek their own interests without regard for 
the outcomes of the other person, and that the other subject 
felt the same way. The final condition, the competitive 
orientation, asked subjects to maximize their own gains and 
to do better than the other person. These orientations were 
then matched with four communication conditions: 1. no 
communication, simultaneous choices; 2, communication, 
simultaneous choices; 3. no communication, sequential choices; 
and 4. no communication, simultaneous choices with the 
opportunity to change choices (reversibility). 
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The results of the study showed that a cooperative 
orientation led to cooperative choices and mutual gain 
regardless of the communication condition. The competitive 
orientation led to competitive choices and mutual loss 
regardless of the communication condition. The results of 
the individualistic orientation were mixed. 
Where choices were sequential and no communication was 
allowed the individualistic orientation resulted in 
competitive play. Where choices were simultaneous and prior 
communication was allowed or when choices were reversible, 
the individualistic orientation resulted in cooperative be-
havior. Furthermore, individualistic and competitive 
orientations both tended to become more competitive over time. 
What these results seem to suggest is that the more 
ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to 
respond competitively: uncertainty breeds self-oriented 
action. The cooperative and competitive orientations were 
quite clear, and subjects' expectations about game behavior 
tended to be confirmed and reinforced. The individualistic 
orientation was less clear. It was not easy to assess the 
motives behind an individualistic choice as contrasted with 
a competitive choice. 
Where ambiguity was high, e.g., with no communication 
and simultaneous choices, individualistic and competitive 
choices were much alike. Where ambiguity was low, e.g., 
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with communication and reversibility options, subjects were 
able to identify their respective motives and clarify the 
most rewarding combination of choices. 
Few other studies have made a deliberate attempt to 
manipulate motivational orientation. Solomon and Deutsch, 
et.al. employ only the individualistic orientations in their 
research. 44 The most one can assume with respect to the 
other research is that in the absence of explicit instruc-
tions concerning orientation, subjects were free to assume 
whatever orientation seemed best. Consequently, no con-
clusions can be drawn about motivational orientation from 
other research. 
Implications 
This research suggests that when two parties with 
relatively equal power, and individualistic orientations, 
come together in conflict that cooperation can be achieved 
if the parties make effective use of communication channels 
and are able to adjust their behavior to one another. In 
this sense, this research differs little from the research 
on contingent strategies. The pertinent question to this 
study is, "how do you move one who enters the conflict with 
a competitive orientation and a power advantage into a more 
cooperative posture?" 
It seems reasonable to assume that the party who has 
been "exploiting" another is more likely to have a competi-
tive than an individualistic orientation. A nonviolent 
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situation is likely to reflect such a competitive orienta-
tion. Furthermore, the relational style of a nonviolent 
situation takes on an abrupt change; from meeting exploita-
tion with cooperation to meeting exploitation with resistance. 
In other words, the motivational orientation of one party has 
shifted from cooperative to competitive. The relationship 
between motivational orientations and their implications for 
choices of strategy needs further exploration. 
The Impact of a Third Party 
It was argued earlier that if a nonviolent strategy is 
to succeed it must have the support of a powerful third 
party. Deutsch conducted a study of the impact of a 3rd 
party on a conflict and found that awareness of mutual 
opposition to a 3rd party led individualistically oriented 
players to choose more cooperatively. 45 When the 3rd party 
was interdependent with the two players and his payoffs 
linked to their losses, there resulted the highest percentage 
of cooperation. When the 3rd party was merely an observer, 
there was less cooperation. The least cooperation occurred 
when there was no 3rd party. 
The mutual awareness of a disliked other may have led 
to the formation of superordinant goals which required cooper-
ation. In other words, to deny the 3rd party his payoffs the 
participants had to cooperate with each other. It may also 
be that when they found some common ground, dislike for 
another, their liking for each other increased, yielding 
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greater cooperation. 
Two other studies used the experimenter as the powerful 
3rd party. Evans found that when the experimenter threatened 
to penalize anyone who used a communication channel to 
deceive the opponent, cooperation increased. 46 Krauss and 
Deutsch discovered that when the experimenter set the norms 
for how the parties were to communicate about the conflict, 
the level of cooperation was increased. 47 
Implications 
What these studies clearly point out is that the 
presence of an involved 3rd party has an impact on the 
conduct of the conflict. The Evans and Krauss and Deutsch 
studies clearly indicate the ability of a powerful 3rd party, 
of greater or lesser power, tries to influence the behavior 
of a power-ful other? How does the power-less party induce 
a power-ful third party to become involved on his behalf? 
How powerful does the 3rd party have to be to successfully 
influence the outcome of the conflict? These and other 
questions still need to be answered. 
Communication and Cooperation 
It was argued in chapter 1 that the key to a successful 
nonviolent campaign was to create sufficient disruption and 
uncertainty such that the protestors could exploit the 
resulting ambiguity and redefine the exchange relationship 
or the norms which govern interaction. There have been 
several studies on the impact of communication on conflict 
which support this contention. 
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There are two ways to approach the question of the 
impact of "communication" on conflict. One way is to 
examine the choice behavior of the participants to deter-
mine the information they convey about the expectations and 
intentions of the players (tacit communication). Multiple 
choice games fall in this category, games where one player 
has a third choice which may be used to signal cooperation 
or competition to the other party. 
Pilisuk and Skolnick, using a multiple choice game, 
found that the inclusion of multiple choices enabled the 
chooser to convey a more precise and unambiguous message 
concerning his desire to cooperate.48 The results were that 
there was a higher level of cooperation than that found in a 
two-choice game. The Gruder and Duslak study also demonstra-
ted the effectiveness of a third choice in signalling the 
players' -intentions and influencing the response of the 
other. 49 Komorita, Sheposh, and Braver also employed a 
third choice which allowed the user to convey one of three 
messages: 1. if you cooperate we can profit equally, but if 
you do not cooperate I will punish you; 2. I have the advan-
tage and intend to use it; and 3. I will not use my power 
over you. 50 Message number 1 was the most effective at 
inducing the other party to cooperate. It must be pointed 
out that in all these studies, the person with the third 
choice was clearly in a more powerful position. Consequently, 
it is hard to determine which had more effect, the power 
advantage or the message. 
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Those studies that have relied upon explicit communi-
cation have produced similar results. Deutsch systematically 
varied the communication content of messages sent between 
individualistically oriented, equal power, players.51 He 
found the level of cooperation significantly enhanced when 
subjects had the capacity to communicate a "system" of 
cooperation. This system included information about mutual 
responsibilities, punishment for competitive behavior and 
procedures for returning to a cooperative relationship, with 
a minimum disadvantage. Terhune likewise found that 
messages which clearly reduced uncertainty concerning the 
intentions and expectations of the players were correlated 
with the amount of cooperative behavior manifested in the 
conflict. 52 
Implications 
Both the studies on tacit and explicit communication 
indicate the importance of communication in structuring the 
conflict. The strategy of nonviolence relies upon the 
uncertainty reduction capacity of communication to redefine 
and restructure the conflict situation. The strategy of 
nonviolence has two functions: first, to create uncertainty 
and second, to reduce it. Noncooperation and civil disobe-
dience are the mechanisms which create uncertainty; messages 
from the protesters and the third party are the mechanism 
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for reducing it. 
More Complex Two-Person Games 
So far most of the studies reviewed have made use of 
the prisoners' dilemma game. The studies to be reviewed now 
have made use of more complex mixed-motive games. Because 
of the structural differences, comparisons are more difficult 
to make. Consequently, it was decided to treat them apart 
from the other research, even though they provide results 
that are quite similar. The similarity of results, in a 
different context, can be taken as reinforcement of the 
general conclusions reached by others. 
Tactical Variety 
Deutsch, et.al., employed a more complex two-person 
game involving the choice of different colored pegs which 
expressed different tactical moves, e.g., attack, defend, 
disarm, etc. 53 They then developed five different strategies 
and tested their effectiveness at inducing cooperation in 
subjects who were individualistically oriented. The five 
strategies were: 
1. Turn the other cheek (TOC) -- the confederate 
responded to attacks and threats altruistically 
(100% coop.). 
2. Nonpunitive (NP) -- the confederate responded 
defensively to attacks and threats and matched 
the subjects behavior otherwise. 
3. Deterrent {D) -- the confederate counter attacked 
when attacked and responded threatingly to any 
competitive acts. 
4. Reformed Sinner -- Confederates shifted their 
strategies after a period of highly competitive 
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play. 
a. Reformed Sinner 1 (RSTOC) -- the confederate 
adopted a turn the other cheek strategy 
after the 16th trial. 
b. Reformed Sinner 2 (RSNP) -- The confederate 
adopted a nonpun1tive strategy after the 
16th trial. 
As can be seen, these five strategies resemble the 
manipulations of other researchers. The TOC strategy 
parallels the 100% cooperative strategy, where the NP and D 
strategies represent variations on the contingent strategy 
of previous research. The differences may be expressed in 
terms of the intensity of the response; the NP being less 
intense than the D strategy. The reformed sinner strategies 
address the issue of shifts in strategy; changing their 
strategies from highly competitive to 100% cooperation in 
one case and matching in the other. 
Subjects chose simultaneously without communication. 
The pegs they chose varied in color and implied different 
responses. The potential combination of colors resulted in 
different payoffs for the subjects. Subjects played against 
accomplices who responded to the subjects moves with pre-
planned programs. 
The effects of the five strategies tended to parallel 
the results of the PD research. When comp~ring the payoffs 
derived by subjects and accomplices and their average 
differences, the effects of the different strategies are 
most clear. Subjects tended to exploit the TOC strategy over 
time. The mean difference from trial block 1 to block IV 
ranged from 6¢ to 12¢. Subjects behaved most cooperatively 
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with the NP strategy. The mean difference in payoffs 
ranging from 1¢ to -2¢. The RSNP strategy produced consider-
ably more cooperation than the RSTOc. 54 
In other words, the unconditionally cooperative strategy 
(TOC) was least effective at eliciting cooperation. The 
contingent strategies elicited significantly more cooperation. 
The less intense strategy (NP) produced more cooperation 
throughout than did the more competitive deterrent strategy. 
Furthermore, the RSTOC strategy produced more cooperation in 
the last two trial blocks than the TOC strategy produced 
throughout. 
The interpretation by Deutsch, et.al. that the TOC 
strategy was "exploited" may be subject to interpretation. 
Clearly, all the research so far reviewed suggests that a 
person is ill advised to employ an unconditionally cooper-
ative strategy if he/she hopes to achieve the maximum 
personal payoff. The only way one can determine if the 100% 
cooperative strategy was exploited would be to ask subjects 
employing the strategy if they felt exploited. 
Implications 
The notion that a 100% cooperative strategy is least 
effective as a strategy at eliciting cooperation is very 
important to a study of nonviolence. Keep in mind that the 
participants in these studies were of relatively equal 
power. If a J.00% cooperative strategy is "exploited" when 
participants are of relatively equal power, how much more 
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likely is it that a power-less party would be "exploited" by 
a power-ful opponent? The contingent strategy has been shown, 
time and time again, to be most effective at eliciting cooper-
ation within a conflict characterized by equal or superior 
power. How effective would it be if employed by the power-
less participant? These are issues that need to be examined. 
Pacifism 
Several studies have been conducted that have sought to 
test "pacifism" as a strategy of conflict management. These 
studies are the only ones that have clearly attempted to 
approximate a "nonviolent" strategy. The primary focus of 
these studies was to examine the impact of the moral dimen-
sion or the moral superiority of pacifism as an inducement 
to cooperation. 
Two studies, one by Shure, Meeker and Hansford and 
the other by Meeker and Shure, have sought to test the 
effectiveness of a "pure" pacifist strategy in a bargaining 
situation. 55 They employed a communication-channel message-
transmission task, similar to the Acme trucking game, where 
they simulated the strategy of a pacifist other. The object 
of the game was to send a message through a one-channel 
system during a fixed time period. 
Three possible patterns of interaction were possible: 
dominance, where one party consistently won, sharing, where 
subjects alternated, and deadlock, where neither subject 
could transmit. The likelihood of a dominating strategy was 
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increased by the inclusion of an electric shock which could 
be used to "override" and "jolt-back" the other from the 
communication channel. The player being forced out had the 
ability to retaliate. 
Subjects played against a preprogrammed pacifist 
strategy. This strategy allowed the subject to transmit 
his/her message first, giving him/her the jolt-back power. 
The pacifist never shocked the subject, but confronted the 
subject by entering the corrununication channel and refusing 
to back-out thereby making a claim to a division or sharing 
of payoffs. By standing in the way the pacifist forced the 
subject to respond "violently" to gain and maintain an 
advantage. To ensure that subjects assumed an aggressive 
posture, some conditions placed the subjects on a team which 
encouraged the dominating strategy. Subjects were then 
confronted with different manipulations after the fifth trial. 
They were provided with information concerning the pacifists 
intentions, biographical data, and information concerning 
disarmament. The pacifists were presented as Quakers with 
a strong moral commitment to fair play and nonviolence. 
The Shure, Meeker and Hansford study made comparisons 
between pregame intentions and subsequent game choices. 56 
They found that out of 143 subjects, 75 planned to employ a 
dominating strategy from the outset. Of the 68 who intended 
to employ an alternating strategy, 54 shifted to a dominating 
strategy. Only 18 subjects refused to use the shock to gain 
the advantage. 
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Meeker and Shure, duplicating and extending the previous 
study, found similar results. 57 Based upon pregame inten-
tions "pacifism" was found to be a relatively ineffective 
strategy for eliciting cooperation. However, based upon 
comparisons made after trial five, the point at which experi-
mental manipulations were introduced, the pacifist strategy 
did influence some shifts from competition to cooperation. 
In fact, by trial five almost 90% of all subjects were 
employing a dominating strategy. From this point on nearly 
one-third of the dominating players shifted to an alternating 
pattern. 58 Construed in this way the results show moderate 
success far the pacifist bargaining strategy. The only 
significant shifts in game behavior occurred in the 
communication condition. 
Rapoport and Deutsch, et.al., argue that the experi-
mental conditions were stacked against the pacifist strategy 
in the first study by the imposition of a competitive 
orientation manipulated through the use of cohorts that 
urged domination. 59 This criticism is true. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the nonviolent "situation" 
would be "stacked against" the pacifist. Consequently, any 
meaningful test of the strategy should be conducted under 
the most stringent conditions. 
At any rate, Meeker and Shure, in response to this 
criticism examined "outsider" influences under two conditions: 
cohort vs. no cohort and audience vs. no audience. 60 In the 
"cohort" condition subjects became more dominant under the 
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urgings of their teammates than when left to themselves. 
However, both the cohort and the no cohort conditions 
shifted toward dominating patterns. 
In the "audience" condition the presence of an observer 
led more than twice as many subjects to plan a cooperative 
approach. However, as the game progressed the two conditions 
tended to converge and show little difference. A more 
interesting result was that in the communication condition 
the absence of an observer resulted in greater cooperation 
than when the observer was present. Perhaps the presence of 
an audience "forces" the actor to behave consistently regard-
less of the consequences. The results are interesting; the 
reasons, unclear. 
Vincent and Tindell, not satisfied with the scope of the 
pacifist studies extended their investigation into sex 
differences, attitudinal orientations (i.e., authoritarian-
ism), intellectual achievement and strategy variation. 61 
Since the primary concern of this study is with strategy, 
only the results of strategy manipulations will be examined. 
Vincent and Tindell examined three strategies: the pure 
pacifist, the warning pacifist and the shocking pacifist. 
The differertces between these strategies rested upon the use 
of threat and retaliation. The warning pacifist threatened 
the use of the shock but never fulfilled his threat. The 
shocking pacifist not only warned but followed through with 
the use of the shock. The pure pacifist renounced the use 
of the shock. 
They expected the shocking condition to inhibit 
aggression. In fact, just the opposite occurred. Warning 
aggressive subjects and then following through only inten-
sified their aggressive behavior. 62 Subjects were also 
quite willing to shock a nonaggressive pacifist opponent. 
There were no significant differences between the pure 
pacifist strategy and the warning pacifist strategy. The 
pacifist strategy was shown to be ineffective at inducing 
cooperation. 
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The participants in these conflicts had equal power to 
the extent that the "jolt-back" ability was available and 
employed by both parties. When the pacifist gave up the 
"jolt-back" ability, or disarmed, he placed himself in a 
power-less position. Reliance upon "civil disobedience" and 
moral persuasion proved to be ineffective weapons. This 
situation cannot be characterized as "noncooperation" be-
cause noncooperation presumes an exchange relationship where 
the withdrawal of support has, at least limited, impact on 
the others' outcomes. The power relationship that existed 
between the parties was based upon threat potential and not 
exchange processes. Consequently, the only source of 
influence the protester had left was moral, or normative. 
This placed the pacifist in a very weak bargaining position 
and he was exploited. 
Ofshe argues that the key to the success of the 
pacifist strategy lies in the application of social pressures 
external to the parties to the conflict. 63 He sums up the 
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findings on pacifism as follows" •.• the progressive 
disclosure of one individual's moral position as a pacifist, 
the pacifist's use of overt gestures of good faith, and his 
rejection of the means of violence have the effect of 
producing either no substantial change in his opponents 
aggressive behavior or results in an increased aggression. 1164 
All of the results gathered so far suggest that the 
subjects~ behavior is controlled by the expectations of the 
experimenter and the expectations and/or actions of others 
external to the conflict, or it is controlled by the appli-
cation of power from the protester. In the absence of a 
powerful protester, the only source of control is an inter-
ested third party. The pressures exerted by "outsiders" 
serve to define the proper game behavior for the subjects 
more so than any information provided by the opponents. In 
fact, the protesters' disclosures are most likely to be 
discounted as trickery or deceit. 65 
Implications 
It is possible to conceive of the pacifist strategy as 
a type of nonviolent strategy; a fairly weak form of a 
contingent strategy which relies solely upon normative 
influences. Even though the pacifist strategy employs 
contingent behavior, it is not born of the exchange relation-
ship. By giving up the jolt-back capability (threat) the 
pacifist creates for himself a power imbalance of the three 
mechanisms for creating change, threat, exchange and norms, 
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the pacifist strategy employs only normative pressures. The 
opponent now has a clear advantage that can be maintained 
and is exploited. The pacifist strategy was able to change 
33% from a dominating to an alternating strategy but these 
do not seem like very favorable odds, especially when the 
stakes may be high. 
The presence of a third party, as an observer or a cohort, 
did influence the subjects game behavior. The question now 
is, "will exhortations to cooperate be equally effective as 
exhortations to dominate and, if so, under what conditions?" 
Beyond this is the question, "how does the pacifist get the 
third party to intervene on his behalf?" 
In real life, the deck is stacked against the nonviolent 
protester. How does he go about ensuring a new shuffle and 
a fair deal? Further research needs to be conducted which 
will identify the characteristics of the social situation and 
the kinds of inputs required to ensure the success of a non-
violent strategy. 
Conclusions 
The review of this research demonstrates quite clearly 
the superiority of a contingent strategy at eliciting coop-
eration when the participants exhibit relatively equal power. 
It has also shown that the presence and/or intervention of 
a third party can influence the outcome of a conflict. 
Furthermore, it has shown that "communication" can serve to 
reduce the uncertainty of a conflict situation and facilitate 
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greater cooperation between conflicting parties. 
The limitations of this research reside in the fact 
that the interests of the researchers have focused on the 
manipulation of strategies by participants with equal or 
greater power. The nonviolent protester is the power-less 
participant. Consequently, the implications of this research 
for an examination of nonviolence is somewhat limited. 
Subsequent research needs to focus more closely on the 
power relationship that exists between the conflicting parties 
and its impact on the efficacy of various strategies. Also, 
future research needs to examine the relationship and poten-
tial impact of a third party on the outcomes of the conflict, 
trying to identify the necessary conditions for successful 
intervention on behalf of the power-less. 
I propose just such an investigation; an examination of 
the impact of a nonviolent strategy as employed by a power-
less participant in a competitive conflict, focusing on the 
role of the third party as an "equalizer." The investigation 
also looks at the impact of differing exchange relationships 
between the third party and the other participants on the 
third party's willingness to intervene on behalf of the power-
dependent; the nonviolent protester. 
Research Questions 
and Hypotheses 
With the preceeding in mind three basic research 
questions are raised: 
1. How will third party intervention (cooperation) 
be affected by existing exchange relationships? 
2. How effective is nonviolence at eliciting the 
cooperation of a powerful third party? 
3. How effective is nonviolence at eliciting 
cooperation from an opponent? 
Each question is a functional pre-requisite to the next. 
'Any investigation of nonviolence must of necessity begin 
with the first question. 
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I have argued elsewhere that since the nonviolent 
protester is relatively weak he will require the support of 
a powerful third party to increase his bargaining position. 
However, not only the third party's willingness to inter-
vene but also the extent of his support will be contingent 
upon his relative dependence upon either the protester, the 
opponent, or both. The third party may also find himself 
in a position of relative independence. 
This means that there are four possible dependency 
conditions. It is hypothesized that these dependency patterns 
will either facilitate or inhibit the support provided the 
protester. A formal statement of these hypotheses is listed 
below. 
A nonviolent strategy employed within a context 
where the third party has an exclusive exchange 
relationship with the power-dependent will be 
more effective than a nonviolent strategy 
employed within a context where the third party 
has an exclusive exchange relationship with the 
power-dominant at eliciting coalition and third 
party intervention on behalf of the power-
dependent. 
A nonviolent strategy employed with a context 
where the third party has an exclusive exchange 
relationship with the power-dependent will be 
more effective than a nonviolent strategy 
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employed within a context where the third party 
has exchange relationships with both the power-
dependent and the power-dominant~eliciting 
coalition and third party intervention on behalf 
of the power-dependent. 
A nonviolent strategy employed within a context 
where the third party has an exclusive exchange 
relationship with the power-dependent will be 
more effective than a nonviolent strategy 
employed within a context where the third party 
has no exchange relationship with either the 
power-dependent or the power-dominant (is 
dependent) • 
The research questions also point to "strategy" as an 
independent variable. The efficacy of nonviolence can only 
be assessed as contrasted with a violent strategy. Research 
hypotheses that address the issue of strategy are listed 
below. 
Where the third party has an exclusive exchange 
relationship with the power-dominant, 'a 
nonviolent strategy will prove more effective 
at eliciting coalition and third party inter-
vention than a violent strategy. 
Where the third party has an exclusive exchange 
relationship with the power-dependent, a 
nonviolent strategy will prove more effective 
at eliciting coalition and third party inter-
vention than a violent strategy. 
Where the third party has an exchange relationship 
with both the power-dominant and the power-
dependent a nonviolent strategy will prove more 
effective at eliciting coalition and third party 
intervention than a violent strategy. 
Where the third party has no exchange relationship 
with either the power-dominant or the power-
dependent, a nonviolent strategy will prove more 
effective at eliciting coalition and third party 
intervention than a violent strategy. 
The purpose of the research undertaken here is to test 
certain of the assumptions which underlie the perceived 
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efficacy of nonviolence as a strategy of protest and 
conflict management. The hypotheses suggested ~epresent an 
attempt to explain the success or failure of nonviolence. 
A procedure designed to provide relevant information to test 
these hypotheses is offered in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
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This chapter presents the research design and the 
procedures used in preparing for and executing this experiment. 
This study limited the investigation to an examination of the 
impact of nonviolence on the perceptions, choices and actions 
of the third party, under differing exchange relationships. 
This resulted in the study assuming a two-way analysis of 
variance design. The specific steps involved in implementing 
this basic design are discussed below under five headings: (1) 
stimulus materials, (2) dependent measures, (3) selection of 
subjects, (4) experimental tasks and procedures, and (5) 
summary of data analysis. 
Stimulus Materials 
The first task that was undertaken was the creation of a 
stimulus that would adequately reflect the characteristics of 
a "nonviolent" conflict situation. The method employed was 
that of a role-play which presented the relevant data to the 
subjects .in the form of a fact-finding report. Role-playing 
was deemed the most efficient and expeditious method for 
implementing this design. Such a procedure allowed for the 
creation of the eight different conditions necessary to test 
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the proposed hypotheses. 
The role-playing situation (developed with the assis-
tance of Dr. Thomas Beisecker) detailed a conflict involving 
three nations: Zimba, Thebes and Sirraco. Zimba was an 
underdeveloped nation that depended on its neighbor, Thebes, 
as the only market for a raw material called illium. Illium 
was the economic foundation of Zimba's well being. Thebes 
purchased illium for a very low price, processed it into 
trillium, a valuable new source of energy, and sold it on the 
open market for enormous profits. Zimba lacked the capital 
to develop the technology necessary to process illium and, 
since Thebes refused to provide financial aid for this purpose, 
she had to remain dependent on Thebes for her survival. 
In this way the essential relationship between power-less 
and power-ful was established. It was also ewphasized that_ 
this was a long standing dependency relationship with the 
expectation that subjects would see resistance on the part of 
Zimba to be unexpected and uncharacteristic. Sirraco was 
introduced as the powerful third party. 
Sirraco was a neighboring country which had been a long 
time friend to both Zimba and Thebes. Sirraco was presented 
as a very powerful country which both Zimba and Thebes turned 
to for assistance. Sirraco's dependence in this situation 
was manipulated through her need for xenthoxide, a raw 
material vitally important to the development of Sirraco's 
economy. Dependency was expressed by making either Zimba the 
sole "friendly" supplier of xenthoxide (dependency condition 
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1), by making Thebes the sole "friendly" supplier of xentho-
xide (dependency condition 2), by making Sirraco dependent on 
their combined output of xenthoxide (dependency condition 3). 
Relative independence (dependency condition 4) was expressed 
; 
as Sirraco having only friendly interests in the well being 
of her two long time allies ,(see Appendix C). 
Both the strategies of violence and nonviolence were 
employed by Zimba; the power-less party. Only the violent 
approach was employed by Thebes. The strategies were 
operationalized as "letters" sent to the leader of Sirraco 
from the leaders of Zimba and Thebes. Nonviolence was expres-
sed as a message from Zimba demanding a fair price for illium, 
indicating a refusal to sell illium to Thebes until they 
agreed to a higher price (noncooperation), and a plea to 
Sirraco to intervene on behalf of Zimba. The violent approach 
presented Zimba heaping verbal abuse on Thebes, demanding a 
fair price, refusing to sell illium, and expressing the belief 
that military action was the only language Thebes would under-
stand. Sirraco was asked to join in the victory which must 
surely follow. Thebes' message, in all conditions, involved 
verpal abuse, a refusal to be blackmailed, a promise to 
punish Zimba through military action for refusing to sell 
illium, and a call for Sirraco's aid (see Appendix D). 
The messages from both.Zimba and Thebes were constructed 
to mirror one another with respect to substance and structure. 
The messages were designed to be as ambiguous as possible; 
providing no clue to an objectively correct solution. The 
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messages from Zimba and Thebes were alternated in the hope of 
minimizing any order effects. These precautions were taken 
to ensure that elements of message construction or order 
would not contaminate the manipulations under investigation. 
The only clear differences should have been with respect to 
strategy and dependency; leaving only the independent vari-
ables as a basis for making a decision concerning cooperation 
and intervention. 
Other information provided to the subjects involved 
background on Sirraco's relationship to the other countries, 
her capacity to intervene successfully, the nature and 
history of the conflict, and the expected difficulty of 
solution (see Appendix B). This information was presented as 
objective data necessary to the development of a common frame 
of reference from which the subjects could base their inter-
pretation of the messages. 
Dependent Measures 
Two methods of observation and measurement were employed. 
Since the intent of this study was to maximize the amount of 
relevant information derived from subjects, a content analysis 
was performed on the messages produced by the subjects. After 
I reading the role-play data, subjects were asked to respond to 
the leaders of the other nations in the form of a letter. 
Writing letters allowed the subjects maximum freedom to respond 
to the situation and conceivably to develop some totally 
unforseen solutions or interpretations. The subsequent 
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content analysis allowed the abstraction of data without 
imposing predetermined response categories. 
The content analysis focused on three general areas: 
intervention direction, intervention means, and motives. I 
designed a coding scheme for each area with specific criteria 
for categorizing subject responses. The coding scheme for 
each content area is presented in detail in Appendix F. 
Intervention direction was a content area constructed to 
measure Sirraco's position with respect to an increase in the 
price of illium. Zimba's demand for an increase in the price 
of illium was the central issue of the conflict, and, conse-
quently, Sirraco's response to this demand should be a good 
indicator of not only the direction but the strength of her 
support. Variationsi in Sirraco's position on the price of 
illium should correspond to strategy and dependenc~ manipul-
ations. 
Within the area of intervention direction subject 
responses were categorized according to Sirraco's expressed 
position on a price increase. These statements were cate-
gorized according to the amount of the increase advocated by 
Sirraco; ranging from no increase to the full increase. Cate-
gories were also included for responses which did not indicate 
a specific price. A category was also constructed for those 
responses which bore no reference to the price of illium. 
The second content area centered on intervention means. 
I 
It specified the methods or mechanisms of intervention and 
influence employed by Sirraco. The scheme called for coding 
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responses within one of four general areas, with special sub-
categories in some. If the subject's statement indicated an 
unwillingness to become involved in the conflict it was 
classified as avoidance. A response that indicated Sirraco's 
desire to act as mediator or called upon the other parties to 
discuss the problem was classified as negotiation. Those 
responses that indicated the imposition of some kind of 
economic sanctions or economic aid were categorized as 
economic intervention. This category was further divided with 
respect to the direction of economic intervention; providing 
aid to Zimba alone, Thebes alone, or both Zimba and Thebes. 
If the subject's message included a statement which threatened 
the use of military action it was classified as military 
intervention. 
The final content area focused on the motives or reasons 
for the course of action proposed by Sirraco. If the theore-
tical assumptions were correct the motives for Sirraco's 
course of action should be a direct function of either 
strategy, dependency, or some combination of both. The final 
item on the survey asked the subject to complete the following 
phrase: "I chose the course of action I did because " . . 
Statements which indicated that subjects reacted against or 
expressed a total rejection of violence as a method of 
resolving conflict were classified as antiviolence motives. 
Responses that reflected a preference for nonviolent means of 
conflict management as the only or best way to solve the 
problem were classified as pro nonviolence motives. 
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Expressions that indicated a strong desire to keep the peace, 
regardless of the cost, were coded as pacifist motives. When 
the subject's response argued that Zimba's needs were of 
paramount importance and Sirraco was acting out of a desire 
for justice or because of moral obligations it was categoriz-
ed as fairness. When Sirraco said that her own needs, either 
economic dependence or national securitf, were most important 
in deciding her course of action it was classified as self-
interest. Statements which argued for compromise as the only 
or best way to solve conflicts were categorized as compromise. 
Categories were also constructed to record responses that were 
uninterpretable or absent. 
It seemed possible that the letters which the subjects 
wrote might not contain all of the information deemed 
necessary to test the hypo~heses so a second method of 
measurement was constructed to compensate fo~ any unforseen 
information gaps. It also seemed advisable to incorporate 
some kind of manipulation check into the measurement process 
to determine whether or not subjects perceived the situation 
and its characteristics as intended. 
This second method of measurement involved the construc-
tion of a forty-five item questionnaire. It was designed to 
gather information concerning subject perceptions, attitudes, 
and reactions to the experimental manipulations. Each survey 
item was a Likert type question with a five point response 
scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
There are six general areas that seemed of particular 
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importance. Questions were designed to gather information on 
each of these areas. See Appendix G for a detailed breakdown 
of these survey areas and their questions. The survey sought 
to assess the motives or reasons for Sirraco's choice of 
'action, the direction of Sirraco's support in the conflict, 
the perceived legitimacy of Zimba's demands, the perceived 
legitimacy of the strategies employed, the method of inter-
vention employed, and a series of manipulation checks. 
In order t~ properly assess the impact of. the nonviolent 
strategy it is important to know what motivated Sirraco to act 
as she did. Questions were designed to test the impact of 
strategy and dependence factors. Also some measure of overall 
impact was necessary so as to determine the general efficacy 
of the strategy. Five questions were designed to measure the 
direction and strength of Sirraco's support of Zimba's demands. 
Another five questions were designed to test Sirraco's per-
ception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands. It seemed 
reasonable to assume that Sirraco's public position may not 
reflect her private preferences, especially if dependency 
needs forced a moderation or alteration of the preferred 
course of action. Several questions were also designed to 
test tne impact of the strategy and dependency manipulations 
on the method of intervention employed by Sirraco. 
Another series of questions were designed as manipulation 
checks. It was important that subjects perceive certain 
-characteristics of the nonviolent situation as described in 
Chapter 1. A major concern was that the subjects perceived 
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the "nonviolent" strategy as truly nonviolent and that they 
saw the "violent" strategy as truly violent. Four questions 
were devised to test this. It was also important that subjects 
saw and understood the power differences between the parties 
and in particular that they saw Zimba as an "oppressed" party. 
Four questions were constructed to verify this concern. 
A characteristic of vital importance to the creation of 
a "nonviolent" conflict situation is that the observer or 
third party expect a violent re~ponse on the part of the 
power-less. Part of the power of the nonviolent strategy is 
that it violates expectations and creates confusion. It seemed 
essential that this expectation be tested. 
It was also believed that if the mundane realism and 
interest expressed by subjects were high that the validity 
and generalizability of the results would be increased. The 
assumption was that an involved subject would provide a more 
spontaneous and honest response. Two questions were construc-
ted to test for these effects. Two final questions were 
included to test for response bias due to demand character-
istics. Four other questions of a miscellaneous nature were 
included to fill out the remainder of the questionnaire. 
Selection of Subjects 
One hundred and sixteen subjects were selected from 
among students attending speech communication courses during 
the summer session of 1979 at the University of Kansas and 
Eastern Illinois University. This resulted in 15 subjects per 
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cell for the nonviolent conditions and 14 per cell for the 
violent conditions. Participation in the experiment was 
voluntary, but generally occurred at the request of their 
instructors. Data concerning the demographic characteristics 
of this sample appear in Appendix H. 
Experimental Task and Procedures 
Approximately 30 subjects participated in each session 
of the experiment. All sessions occurred within a two week 
time period from June 8-19, 1979. Sessions were held in 
classrooms during the time of their regularly scheduled class. 
The experimenter was introduced by the class instructo~ 
and proceeded to hand out the informed consent statement and 
instruction form. They were asked to read the statements and 
then sign. When these were returned subjects were given a 
packet of information containing all of the stimulus materials 
for a single condition and the response forms for their letters. 
The attitude survey was not distributed until after they had 
finished their letters. Prior to the sessions the packets 
were indexed and coded. They were then distributed in an order 
that would ensure randomness. Th'ev were asked to write the 
index/code number at the top of their response forms and 
their attitude survey. Afterwards response forms and surveys 
could then be matched for data analysis. 
Subjects were instructed that they were being asked to 
participate in a role-playing situation involving several 
different conflict situations. They were asked to assume the 
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the role of the leader of the country of Sirraco. As leader 
they were to make a decision concerning Sirraco's course of 
action in a conflict involving two neighboring countries. 
They were further instructed that there were eight different 
conflict situations, but they were being asked to respond to 
only one (see Appendix A). 
Subjects were given time to read their reports and then 
respond to the letters. They were instructed to begin when-
ever they were ready~ No specific time limits were imposed 
on the subjects. They took anywhere from 30 minutes to 1½ 
hours to complete the exercise. The average lapsed time to 
complete the task was 1 hour. Subjects were allowed to leave 
when they were done, however, they were told that an explan-
ation of the experiment would follow. When time was not 
sufficient for a thorough debriefing the experimenter returned 
and provided an explanation at the next class period. Because 
of the sequencing of the classes (one after the other on the 
same day) it seems unlikely that the experiment was compromised 
by subjects discussing the experiment with students from other 
classes. 
Summary of the Data Analysis 
Subject messages were analyzed according to the content 
categories identified above. The content categories were 
abstracted from the messages after they were written. In 
other words, the subject responses suggested the categories. 
To insure that the coding scheme for impressions and responses 
was not idiosyncratic to the experimenter, criteria for 
defining each category were established. These criteria 
should have enabled another person, unacquainted with the 
study, to code in a similar manner. 
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Therefore, I provided an independent judge with the 
coding system (see Appendix F) and asked her to independently 
code all 116 responses. The percentages of agreement were 
quite high, 83%. Consequently, I decided that the criteria 
were valid and reliable. 
Subject responses to the survey and the demographic 
information sheet were transferred to coding sheets and then 
to punched cards. A spot check of selected surveys against 
the coding sheet revealed no errors in transferring inform-
ation. The punched cards were verified against the coding 
sheet. 
A one-way analysis of variance was applied to the 
attitude survey in order to determine which if any of the 45 
items showed any significant effects. Those items which 
showed significance were then subjected to a two-way analysis 
of variance. The two-way analysis was followed by at-test 
for determining differences between several means so as to 
identify the specific differences between conditions. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results of the experiment conducted to test the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter II are reported here. An 
extended discussion of these results and their impact on the 
arguments about the nature and efficacy of nonviolence will 
be deferred until the next chapter. The first set of 
results reported below will summarize the data pertinent to 
the "dependency" hypotheses. The second set of results 
relate to the "strategy" hypotheses. Following this I will 
examine the results of the__manipulation_checks. Finally, I 
will present a swnmary of the demographic data. 
Tests of Hypotheses: 
Dependence 
The "dependence" hypotheses were designed to test the 
impact of exchange relationships on the effectiveness of a 
nonviolent strategy at inducing a third party to intervene 
on behalf of the power-less. Four dependency conditions were 
identified: 1. a condition where the third party was depen~ 
dent on the power-ful (D/C 1), 2. a condition where the third 
party was dependent on the power-less (D/C 2), 3. a condition 
where the third party was dependent on both the power-ful and 
the power-less (D/C 3), and 4. a condition where the third 
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party was relatively independent (D/C 4). 
The hypotheses were based on the assumption that third 
party intervention would be impeded or reinforced by existing 
exchange relationships. The effectiveness of the nonviolent 
,-
strategy should be enhanced when the third party is linked 
with the power-less and should be inhibited when the third 
party is linked with the power-ful. 
The content areas of Intervention Direction and 
Intervention Means were constructed to assess the impact of 
both dependence and strategy factors on Sirraco's support 
for Zimba. A chi-square analysis of both Direction and 
Means provided no significant differences between dependence 
conditions. Further, a one-way analysis of variance of those 
survey items designed to measure Sirraco's "direction of 
support" (see Appendix G, Section 1) showed no significant 
differences. 
These questions asked whether Sirraco chose to support 
Zimba, Thebes or some compromise position. The mean response 
for item #16 (support Zimba) was 3.13 or neutral. The mean 
response for #27 (support Thebes) was 1.94, a clear no. 
Item #32 (support compromise) had a mean response of 4.5, 
indicating strong agreement. This pattern suggests that 
subjects, in general, supported a compromise position which 
rejected Thebes and favored Zimba. This compromise was 
consistent across all conditions. 
The results of the content analysis of subject "letters" 
and the analysis of variance test on the relevant survey 
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items also failed to provide evidence in support of bhe 
dependency hypotheses. Even though no dependency effects 
were demonstrated on these measures there were some inter-
esting results relating to dependency factors. One survey 
category in particular proved quite informative; those items 
which sought to test the impact of dependence on Sirraco's 
perception of "pressure" generated by dependence relation-
ships {see Appendix G, Section Sa). Of the six survey items 
constructed for this category four of them provided signi-
ficant results; items 3, 9, 28, and 44 (see Table 4-1). 
Survey item #22 also provided significant results related to 
dependency considerations (see Table 4-2). An examination of 
the pattern of response provides indirect support for 
hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
Questionnaire item #3 provided some interesting results. 
The F ratio comparing difference between dependence conditions 
was significant (F = 3.75, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .013). As 
expected, Sirraco felt the strongest pressure in support of 
Thebes when they were linked in an exclusive exchange 
relationship. The mean response for D/C 1 was significantly 
greater than for any of the other dependence conditions. 
Within the nonviolent condition (NVS) a comparison between 
D/C 1 and D/C 2 proved significant in the expected direction. 
Dependency factors did significantly influence Sirraco's 
perception of "pressure.n 
An interesting pattern of results, not directly related 
to theh~potheses, involved a comparison of response means 
TABLE 4-1 
Response Means for 
Survey Itans: 
Perceived Pressure 
#3 Because of Sirraco's dependence on :xenthoxide I felt pressured 
to support Thel:es. (strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 2.60 3.21 2.91 
D/C 2 2.07 2.14 2.11 
D/C 3 2.53 2.21 2.37 
D/C 4 2.27 2.43 2.35 
M 2.37 2.43 
F ratio far main effect for dependence = 3. 75, d.f. = 3, 108; 
p = .013 
Critical difference between individual cell means = .450, d.f. = 108; 
p = .05 
#9 Because of Sirraco's dependence on xenthoxide I felt pressured 
to support Zimba. (strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Irrlividual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 2.27 1.93 2.10 
D/C 2 3.20 3.00 3.10 
D/C 3 2.80 2.00 2.40 
D/C 4 2.47 2.71 2.59 
M 2.69 2.41 
F ratio for main effect for dependence = 6.013, d.f. = 3, 108; 
p = .001 
Critical difference between individual cell means = .567, d.f. = 108; 
p = .05 
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Table 4-1 Cont. 
#44 Sirraco could not afford to antagonize the conflicting parties. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
ws vs M 
D/C 1 3.33 3.36 3.35 
D/C 2 3.50 3.64 3.57 
D/C 3 4.00 3.64 3.82 
D/C 4 2.73 2.64 2.69 
M 3.39 3.32 
F ratio for main effect for dependence= 5.09, d.f. = 3, 107; 
p = .002 
Critical difference between individual cell means= .719, d.f. = 107; 
p = .05 
#28 Sirraco's needs in this situation were of paramount importance. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C l 3.20 3.71 3.46 
D/C 2 3.79 4.00 3.90 
D/C 3 3.20 3.79 3.50 
D/C 4 3.13 3.07 3.10 
M 3.33 3.64 
F ratio for main effect for dependence= 3.601, d.f. = 3, 107; 
p = .016 
Critical difference between individual cell means = • 557, d. f. = 107: 
p = .05 
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TABLE 4-2 
Response Means for 
Survey Items: 
Perceived Legitimacy of Danands 
#22 Zimba was not justified in making its danands. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= l} 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs 
D/C 1 2.33 2.43 
D/C 2 1.67 2.36 
D/C 3 1.87 2.29 
D/C 4 2.27 1. 79 






F ratio for two-way interaction effect (S X D) = 3. 36, d. f. = 3, 108; 
p = .022 
Critical difference between individual cell means = .456, d.f. = 108; 
p = .05 
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within the violent condition (VS). D/C 1 was found to be 
significantly greater than D/C 2, D/C 3, and D/C 4. Further, 
the mean response for D/C 1 in the violent condition was 
significantly greater than the mean response for D/C 1 in 
the nonviolent condition. This indicates that Sirraco felt 
the pressure to support Thebes most strongly when both 
Thebes and Zimba employed a violent strategy. It also 
suggests that the nonviolen~ strategy inhibited or reduced 
these dependency pressures. Furthermore, it is possible 
that dependency becomes a much more salient decision factor 
when strategies do not differ. 
Survey item #9 is similar to #3 in that is also assessed 
perceived dependency pressures but with regard to Zimba not 
Thebes. A comparison of means between dependency conditions 
shows D/C 2 to be significantly greater than D/C 1 and D/C 3 
(F = 6.013, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .001). A comparison of 
means within the nonviolent condition (NVS) shows that the 
perceived pressure to support Zimba was greater in D/C 2 
than D/C l or D/C 4. Here again exchange relationships 
seem to have influenced Sirraco's perception of "pressure." 
The pattern of these results provide indirect support for 
hypotheses 1 and 3. 
The results from survey item #44 also provided indirect 
support for the research hypotheses. Item #44 sought to 
assess Sirraco's sensitivity to actions which might be per-
ceived as hostile or antagonistic to an exchange partner. 
Dependency factors did significantly affect their sensiti-
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vity (F = 5.09, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .002). Both D/C 2 and 
D/C 3 were significantly greater than D/C 4, where Sirraco 
was relatively independent. This suggests that dependency 
did affect their perception of antagonistic choices if not 
their actual course of action. This would tend to suggest 
an inhibiting effect from dependency factors. 
It would seem reasonable to assume that as one per-
ceives greater pressure from some direction that it would 
influence the course of action they chose and that as the 
perceived pressure varied so would the amount of support 
given. However, the results cited above indicate that no 
corresponding changes in Sirraco's behavior were observed. 
This suggests one of two things: either the subjects 
deliberately resisted these pressures or the methods of 
assessing the nature and direction of Sirraco's support were 
not sufficiently sensitive. More will be said on this in 
Chapter V. 
Item #28 showed significant main effects due to the 
dependence conditions with regard to the perceived salience 
of Sirraco's needs (F = 3.601, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .016). 
A comparison among cell means in the nonviolent condition 
(NVS) showed the perceived importance of Sirraco's needs to 
be greatest where Sirraco was linked in an exclusive exchange 
relationship with Zimba (D/C 2 greater than D/C 1, D/C 3 and 
D/C 4). The question is why would Sirraco see its stake in 
D/C 2 to be any greater than any other dependency condition? 
Survey item #22 also provided significant differences 
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between cell means for dependence conditions (see Table 4-2). 
This item sought to assess Sirraco's perception of the 
legitimacy of Zimba's demands. One would expect that a 
dependency relationship which favored Zimba would enhance 
their perceived legitimacy. An examination of #22 confirms 
this expectation. Within the nonviolent condition, the 
mean response for D/C 2 was significantly greater than D/C 1 
and D/C 4 (F = 3.36, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .022) ft 
A dependency relationship that favored Zimba seems to 
have resulted in an enhanced perception of the legitimacy 
of Zimba's demands while an exchange relationship which 
favored Thebes reduced the perceived legitimacy of those 
demands. One would expect that attitudes favorable to an 
expressed position would result in actions supportive of 
that position and that the more favorable the attitude the 
greater the support. However, Sirraco's recorded position in 
this conflict did not confirm this expectation. 
In summary, no direct support of the dependency 
hypotheses was found. However, the finding do indicate that 
dependency did influence the subjects' perceptions of the 
situation. Exchange relationships did affect the subjects' 
perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands, the percep-
tion of dependency pressures, and the perceived salience 
of Sirraco's needs. The pattern of responses from these items 
suggests an interpretation of the situation that favored 
Zimba, however, there is no confirmation that they influenced 
Sirraco's actual course of action. These results do seem to 
provide indirect support for the impact of exchange 
relationships. 
Tests of Hypotheses: 
Strategy 
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Hypotheses 4 through 7 predicted the relative effective-
ness of a nonviolent versus a violent strategy within each 
of four dependency conditions. The content area labeled 
Intervention Direction was used to determine the direction 
and degree of support tendered by Sirraco. Sirraco's 
support was assessed by determining her position on an 
increase in the price of illium. This measure did not prove 
to be as effective as originally hoped. Subjects responded 
with a multitude of complex solutions which were not easily 
quantified. The solutions suggested often consisted of a 
combination of actions or failed to specify a clear outcome. 
For example, one solution demanded that Thebes pay the full 
increase asked by Zimba, whereas another advocated a summit 
meeting with a promise of financial aid to one or both of 
the other countries, while another advocated a gradual 
increase in the price of illium with financial aid going to 
Thebes to help compensate. However, relying on the original 
assumption did provide some information relevant to the 
question. 
A comparison of strategy with Sirraco's expressed 
position on the price of illium showed significance in the 
expected direction (Chi-square= 13.77, d.f. = 5; p = .025; 
see Table 4-3). However, a contingency coefficient of .327 
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T.ABIB 4-3 
Stmnary of Chi-square Analysis 
for Intervention Direction 
Direction: Price of Illium Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6* 
NVS 11 9 1 17 17 5 60 
vs 5 5 10 9 22 4 55 
Total 16 14 11 26 39 9 115** 
Chi-square= 13.77, d.f. = 5, p = .025; c.c. = 3.27 
* Res:ponse categories 
1. support full increase 
2. supports increase greater than 50% 
3. supports increase less than 50% 
4. supports sane unspecified increase 
5. supports unspecified negotiations 
6. uncodable 
** one response missing 
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suggests that the relationship is fairly weak. 
The results indicate that strategy did influence the 
degree of support which Zimba received from Sirraco, at least 
with respect to the price increase. Twice as many subjects 
supported a price increase greater than 50% in the nonviolent 
condition as compared to subjects in the violent condition. 
Approximately 33% more subjects chose some unspecified 
negotiations in the violent condition as compared to subjects 
in the nonviolent condition. Finally, almost twice as many 
subjects in the nonviolent conditions favored some kind of 
price increase as compared to those in the violent conditions. 
Whereas these results do not provide specific support 
for individual hypotheses they do provide evidence that 
strategy does have a signficant impact on the course of 
action chosen by the third party. The weakness of these 
results may be due to the variety and complexity of the 
solutions advocated rather than to the efficacy of the 
strategy. Further clarification is required on this point. 
An examination of the questionnaire provided very little 
in the way of support for these hypotheses. Three survey 
items were constructed to assess the direction and level of 
Sirraco's support (see Appendix G, Section 1). These 
questions asked whether Sirraco chose to support Thebes, 
Zimba, or some compromise position. A one-way analysis of 
variance showed no significant differences between conditions 
for any of the items. 
Two other questionnaire categories provided results 
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relevant to the impact of strategy: the content category 
which focused on the perceived legitimacy of Zimba's demands 
and the one which assessed the impact of strategy on the 
degree of Sirraco's support (see Appendix G, Sections 2 and 
Sa) . 
Five survey items were designed to test the subjects' 
perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands. A two-way 
analysis of variance showed item #22 to have a significant 
interaction effect (F = 3.65, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .022; see 
Table 4-2). At-test for differences between means showed 
a significant difference in the expected direction for D/C 2, 
whereas significance was found in the opposite direction for 
D/C 4 (NVS vs. VS). An examination of the pattern of results 
indicates that the condition where Sirraco most favored 
Zimba's demands was D/C 2 in the nonviolent condition, 
whereas Sirraco's support for Zimba's demands was strongest 
in D/C 4 for the violent condition. The results from item 
#22 provided support for hypothesis 5; however, it provided 
evidence in the opposite direction for hypothesis 7. 
The mean response for the other survey items dealing 
with "perceived legitimacy" indicated that subjects, regard-
less of conditions believed Zimba was right in making its 
demands and did not believe the original price was fair. 
However, subjects appeared.undecided about the necessity 
of the full increase. 
Three survey items sought to test the impact of strategy 
on the subjects choice of action (see Appendix G, Section Sa}. 
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A one-way analysis of variance demonstrated only one item to 
be significant, #23 (F = 3.17, d.f. = 7, p = .004). A two-
way analysis of variance showed a significant mean effect for 
strategy (F = 13.15, d.f. = 1, 108; p = .00). At-test for 
difference between several means showed significant differ-
ences for 3 of the 4 conditions: NVS D/C 1 greater than 
VS D/C 1, NVS D/C 2 greater than VS D/C 2, and NVS D/C 3 
greater than VS D/C 3 (see Table 4-4). 
Item #23 showed a marginally significant interaction 
effect (F = 2.65, d.f. = 3, 108; p = .053). In the nonviolent 
condition subjects indicated that Thebes' "approach" to the 
conflict influenced their choice of action most strongly 
in D/C 1, D/C 2 and D/C 3. However, in the violent condition 
Thebes' "approach" influenced subjects' choice of action 
) 
most strongly in D/C 4, where Thebes was relatively 
independent. 
The pattern of results for item #23 provided indirect 
support for hypotheses 4 , 5 and 6'. The results ~how that 
contrasting Thebes' violent strategy against Zimba's 
nonviolent approach did significantly influence Sirraco's 
choice of action. However, subjects seemed to react against 
the violence more so than reacting for the nonviolent. 
Two other survey items, #31 and #39, showed significant 
main effects for strategy (see Table 4-5). Subject responses 
indicate that while subjects were uncertain about how well 
Zimba handled the situation in the nonviolent condition, they 
clearly disapproved of Zimba's handling of the conflict in 
TABIE 4-4 
Response Means for 
Survey Items: 
Perceived rnpact of Strategy 
#23 My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by 
'lllebes. {strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = l} 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 3.47 2.57 3.02 
D/C 2 3.53 2.57 3.05 
D/C 3 3.47 2.50 2.99 
D/C 4 3.13 3.36 3.25 
M 3.40 2.75 
F ratio for main effect for strategy= 13.15, d.f. = .1 • .108; 
p = .oo 
F ratio for interaction effect (S X D) = 2.65, d.f. = 3, .108; 
p = .053 
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critical difference between individual cell means = .596, d.f. = 108; 
p = .05 
TABLE 4-5 
Response Means for 
SW:vey Items: 
Perceived legitimacy of Strategy 
:ft31 I thought Z:i.rnba handled the mole situation rather well. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 3.53 1.89 2.71 
D/G--2 2.-93 1.93 _2.43 
D/C 3 3.00 2.29 2.65 
D/C 4 3.20 2.00 2.60 
M 3.17 2.03 
F ratio for main effect for strategy= 54.41, d.f. = 1, 107; 
p • .00 
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Critical difference between ind.ividual cell rreans = .517, d.f. = 107; 
p = .05 
#39 I thought Z.llnba's behavior was inappropriate and out of plac~. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 2.33 3.07 2.70 
D/C 2 2.27 2.79 2.53 
D/C 3 2.13 2.57 2.35 
D/C 4 2.67 3.21 2.94 
M 2.35 2.91 
F ratio for main effect for strategy= 9. 796, d.f. = 1, 108; 
p = .002 
critical difference between individual cell means = .594, d.f. = 108; 
p = .OS 
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the violent condition. And, whereas they expressed uncertain 
ty about the appropriateness of Zimba's approach in the 
violent condition, they clearly say nonviolence as appro-
priate. This seems contradictory, but it may reflect more 
of an assessment of the methods of dealing with conflict in 
general than with an evaluation of the nonviolent strategy. 
Refusing to sell illium and creating a major incident may 
have seemed an __ inapp 9p:i;:__i_~~~ way of dealinq with this conflict, 
reflecting poor handling. However, if the choice is between 
violence and nonviolence they clearly prefer nonviolence. 
In summary, the results from the content analysis of 
Intervention Direction provided partial support for the 
"strategy" hypotheses. Strategy did influence Sirraco's 
choice of action in favor of Zimba but its effect could not 
be determined for specific exchange relationships. The 
results from the survey items provided partial support for the 
hypotheses. Item #22 provided support for hypothesis 5 but 
contradicted hypothesis 7. Item #23 supported hypotheses 4, 
5, and 6. 
Manipulation Checks 
A review of the results of the manipulation checks 
reveals that subjects did perceive a clear difference between 
the strategies. Four items related to a descriptive assess~ 
ment of the strategies (see Table 4-6). When asked if they 
believed Zirnba's strategy was nonviolent (#7) the mean 
response in the nonviolent condition was 3.78, indicating 
agreement, while the mean response in the violent condition 
TABIE 4-6 
Response Means for 
survey Items: 
Manipulation Check -- Strategy 
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#7 Z.imba's approach to this whole situation could be called nonviolent. 
(strongly agree= 5, strongly disagree= 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 3.87 1.57 2.72 
·D/C 2 -3.-93- -1. 6-1 2-.--79 
D/C 3 3.60 1.71 2.66 
D/C 4 3.71 1.78 2.66 
M 3.78 1.68 
F ratio for main effect for strategy= 124.54, d.f. = 1, 107; 
p = .00 
Critical difference between irxlividual cell means = .625, d.f. = 107; 
p = .OS 
fl4 I thought the tone of Z.irnba's message was quite hostile. 
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1) 
Individual Cell Means 
NVS vs M 
D/C 1 2.20 4.21 3.21 
D/C 2 2.07 4.07 3.07 
D/C 3 1.93 3.71 2.82 
D/C 4 2.60 4.07 3.34 
M 2.20 4.02 
F ratio for main effect for strategy= 108.89, d.f. = 1, 108; 
p = .00 
Critical difference between individual cell means = .577, d.f. = 1081 
p = .05 
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was 1.68, indicating disagreement. A two-way analysis of 
variance showed these to be significantly different (F = 
I 
124.54, d.f. = 1, 107; p = .00). The strategy manipulation 
clearly worked. 
Subjects also indicated an understanding of the power 
relationships that existed between the three countries and 
they found the role-playing situation both realistic and 
interesting (see Tables 4-7 and 4-8). However, subjects did 
not "expect" a violent response from Zimba. Item #25 asked 
the subject if given the circumstances as presented, whether 
or not they would have expected Zimba to react violently (see 
Table 4-8). The reader may remember that one of the key 
factors for defining a nonviolent context is that partici-
pants and observers perceive violence as a "reasonable" and 
expected response. The responses to i25 provided no 
significant differences, but the mean response was 3.03, 
suggesting uncertainty. Consequently, this experimental 
situation may not, by definitio3t, qualify as a "nonviolent" 
conflict. 
Furthermore, a check for possible demand characteristics 
indicated that subjects believed they knew the purpose of 
the study (see Table 4-8). Subjects responded across all 
conditions that they did know what was expected of them, but 
that they did not commit themselves to a solution early in 
the exercise. The possibility of a demand characteristic 
limits the viability of this experiment. 
TABIB 4-7 
Assessment of Power Relationships 
#2 Sirraco's support is the key to Zirrba's success. 
mean response = 3. 91 - agree 
#8 Z:ilnba anl 'Ihebes are equal in teJ:ItlS of power. 
mean response = 1. 71 -- disagree 
#15 Sirraco is stronger th.an Thebes and Zimba canbined. 
mean response = 3. 95 -- agree 
#18 'Ihebes has daninated and exploited Zimba. 




SUmmary of One-way Analysis 
Assessment of Role-playing Situation 
:fl:6 I thought this conflict represented a realistic situation. 
mean response = 4.08 - agree 
#:20 I found this to be an interesting and involving experience. 
mean response= 3.7 -- agree 
Surrmaty of One-way Analysis 
Expectation of Violent Reaction 
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#25 Given the circumstances, I \\Ould expect Zimba to react violently. 
mean response= 3.03 -- neutral 
SumP.ary of One-way Analysis 
DaTiand Olaracteristics 
#12 I haven't the slightest idea as to what this experiment is 
trying to prove. 
mean response= 2.5 -- disagree 
#37 I decided fran the very beginning that ~hebes should pay 
Zimba's price. 
mean response= 2.5 -- disagree 
111 
Demographic Data 
A review of the demographic data collected from the 
subjects reveals that of the one hundred and sixteen subjects 
62% were female, approximately 78% were caucasian, and the 
average age was approximately 22 years. The majority of 
subjects (53%) expressed an affiliation with a protestant 
religion, but clearly 25% expressed no religious preference, 
Politically, 44% declared themselves to be independents, !ith 
the remainder fairly evenly divided between Democrats and 
Republicans. Thirty percent of the subjects identified 
themselves as liberals, 41% claimed to be politically 
moderate, while only 6% identified themselves as politically 
conservative. These figures tend to suggest that this sample 
was representative of a fairly young, liberally oriented, 
predominantly caucasion population (see Appendix Hl, 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The data summarized in Chapter IV are discussed below. 
First, I will present a qeneral discussion and explanation 
of the research results. Second, I will examine specff1c 
aspects of the research design which may provide an alternate 
explanation of the research findings. Finally, I will con-
clude with a discussion of the implications of these 
findings for future research. 
General Discussion 
The results of this study provide evidence that strategy 
does have a significant effect on the position taken by a 
third party, even though that effect is weak. The results 
also support the prediction that dependency has an impact on 
third party intervention, but the precise nature of the impact 
is not clear. Those measures which were intended as a direct 
assessment of dependency effects on Sirraco's support for 
Zimba proved nonsignificant. However, several survey items 
(#3, #9, #22, #28, and #44) demonstrated that dependency did 
influence Sirraco's percpetion of the situation in a way that 
favored Zimba, but these perceptions, apparently, did not 
result in behavioral differences in support. 
It is clear from these results that subjects perceived 
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strategy differences and dependency pressures, but they 
appear to have ignored or played down these factors in 
pursuit of a 11 fair 11 solution or resolution to the conflict. 
A close examination of "motives" and "intervention means" 
indicates that subjects shared a fairly consistent view of 
the proper way to deal with the conflict. Respondents 
consistently assumed the position that the only fair solution 
would b~ a compromise brou2ht about through negotiation. 
An examination of the results shows that subjects 
favored diplomatic intervention, negotiation and mediation, 
as the dominant means of social influence (62%). Approx-
imately 35% of the subjects indicated that compromise was 
the best method of resolving conflict; while 21% indicated a 
"concern for fairness" as their motive. Response patterns 
on the survey items #16, #27, and #32 show compromise as 
clearly the dominant solution. However, it is also possible 
that 11 compromise 11 was an umbrella term used by subjects to 
cover a solution that favored Zimba without giving full and 
unqualified support. If this is the case, then the method of 
measurement was not sensitive enough to identify the 
variations. 
Nonviolence, as a strategy, seeks to bring about negoti-
ation. However, the demand for negotiation was equally 
strong in the violent conditions. One of two reasons may be 
working here: either subjects were reacting to the disruption 
of social and economic ties through the imposition of control-
ing norms or they we:re applying a general 11 myth" of conflict 
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strategy differences and dependency pressures, but they 
appear to have ignored or played down these·factors in 
pursuit of a "fair" solution or resolution to the conflict. 
A close examination of ''motives" and "intervention means" 
indicates that subjects shared a fairly consistent view of 
the proper way to deal with the conflict. Respondents 
consistently assumed the position that the only fair solution 
wourd -15e- a- crompromise lYrought- about through-~negotiation-. 
An examination of the results shows that subjects 
favored diplomatic intervention, negotiation and mediation, 
as the dominant means of social influence (62%). Approx-
imately 35% of the subjects indicated that compromise was 
the best method of resolving conflict; while 21% indicated 
a "concern for fairness" as their motive. Response patterns 
on the survey items #16, #27, and #32 show compromise as 
clearly the dominant solution. However, it is also possible 
tliat "compromise" is an umbrella term used by subjects to 
cover a solution that favored Zimba without giving full and 
unqualified support. If this is the case then the method of 
measurement was not sensitive enough to identify the 
variations. 
Nonviolence, as a strategy, seeks to bring about negoti-
ation, however, the demand for negotiation was equally strong 
in the violent conditions. One of two reasons may be working 
here: either subjects were reacting to the disruption of 
social and economic ties through the imposition of control-
ling norms or they are applying a general "myth" of conflict 
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resolution which argues that the only fair solution is a 
compromise. There is evidence to suggest that the more 
intense the disruption brought about by conflict, the more 
likely those involved are to invoke superordinant norms;l 
in this case the norm of "talking it over." If this is the 
case subjects may have reacted against the threat of violent 
conflict more so than supporting a nonviolent approach. The 
"myth" of comprnmise wou1d--certa:in-1r-consti tute one norm~-of 
conflict management that could be easily applied. 
If either or both of these explanations is correct, it 
would represent a major social obstacle (or at least deny a 
hoped for advantage) to the success of a nonviolent strategy 
and would tend to suggest that either strategy, violent or 
nonviolent, would be effective if sufficiently disruptive. 
However, and I think this is important, nonviolence elicited 
a more favorable response, even given this barrier, than did 
violence. Subjects were more willing to support the demands 
of Zimba in the nonviolent conditions than in the violent 
conditions. 
Another interesting finding is that dependency factors 
seemed to carry greater force in the violent conditions, where 
both Zimba and Thebes responded violently, than in the non-
violent conditions. This raises a question regarding the 
relative impact of strategy versus dependency. In Chapter I 
I argued that dependency was a primary, or more forceful, 
factor than strategy. These results suggest that subjects 
were more willing or better able to resist dependency pres-
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sures when nonviolence was employed that when a violent stra-
tegy was used by both countries. Of course, it may also be 
that dependency became a more salient or useful criterion 
when no other significant criterion was available. Even so, 
this suggests that in the value hierarchy of these subjects, 
strategy was a more important variable than was dependency. 
In summary, the impact of strategy on third party inter-
vention was not strong, but it was significant. Dependency 
factors were recognized, but the precise nature of their 
effect was not consistent. These results do provide evidence 
that a nonviolent strategy is superior to a violent strategy 
in the management of conflict and the elicitation of support 
from a powerful third party. These results also suggest the 
possibility of a strong socio-psychological barrier which may 
inhibit the success of any strategy. 
I have tried to provide an explanation for the results 
which were reported in Chapter IV. It is possible that the 
results may have been the result of other factors unrelated 
to the impact of the manipulations themselves. The next 
section seeks to explore specific aspects of the research 
design, which upon reflection may have been responsible for 
some of the effects, or lack of effects, associated with this 
study. This review is not intended as an apology for the 
research results but merely to explore all possible avenues 
which might explain the observed data. 
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Alternative Explanations 
Obviously, one explanation for the weakness of the 
results is that nonviolence is a weak strategy. However, 
before one can make such a claim, every effort should be made 
to identify and examine any alternative explanations for the 
observed results. Some of these explanations were examined 
___a_pove. Those explanations which miqht derive from factors 
involved with the research design or sample selection are 
examined here. 
The first area involves possible sample bias. The 
demographic data on this sample (summarized in Chapter IV) 
indicates a fairly young group of college students who des-
cribe themselves as politically moderate or liberal. It 
could very well be that this sample is not representative of 
the greater population. College students may approach what 
is a complex social situation with fairly naive and simp-
listic attitudes about how the world operates or, at least, 
how it should operate. This possibility can be eliminated 
only after conducting research with other samples which 
reflect other political and attitudinal perspectives. 
It may also be that research results were influenced by 
the history or context of the conflict. It was important to 
the theory that nonviolence be tested in a context where 
subjects expected a violent response from Zimba. If this 
were to be a true test of nonviolence then participants and 
observers must expect a violent response. The violation of 
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such expectation serves to enhance the moral impact of the 
strategy. Survey item #25 sought to test for this expectation 
and found subjects uncertain. 
An attempt to develop such an expectation was incorpor-
ated in the background information provided the subjects. It 
was hoped that by presenting a history of the development of 
the conflict subjects would agree that a violent response by 
Zj~_mba se~med "exoected" if not reasonable. It may be that 
the history failed in this respect. If so, then the reactions 
of both parties may have seemed inexplicable; the intensity 
of the conflict wholly unexpected. The subjects may have 
pursued a cautious approach in order to gather more inform-
ation and so better enable them to deal with the conflict. 
Such a reaction would tend to diminish the impact of the 
strategy and dependency manipulations. 
Another factor that may have influenced subject 
responses was the message order. Because of the nature of 
the messages the subjects might have relied on the order of the 
messages as a means of fixing blame and assessing the appro-
priateness.of the others' response. The country which was the 
author of the first message would be seen as the one 
who "started the fight 11 and the subjects evaluation of the 
second party's response would be conditioned by the first 
message. Consequently, the order of the messages could have 
been used to establish subject expectations, and perhaps 
should have been used to do so. However, message order was 
randomized in order to minimize such effects for fear they 
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would interfere with strategy and dependency manipulations. 
Subsequent research should examine the significance of per-
ceived blame and the effects of message order in establishing 
this perception. 
A fourth factor which may have influenced the results 
of this study is the perceived salience of Sirraco's depen-
dence on xenthoxide. This was a fairly complex role-play 
situat:ion-.-- -A number of -factors needed to -be -remembered-and 
analyzed by the participants. The only ~lace Sirraco's 
dependence was mentioned was in the statement of background 
information. It could be that in processing subsequent 
information her dependency was either forgotten or its 
importance minimized; this latter especially true if subjects~ 
were not able to perceive the potential threat to her 
supplies as a result of the conflict. This would account 
I ' ' ' 
I 
for the lack of effects due to dependency. 
I In future research some effort will need to be taken to 
ensure that subjects perceive some potential threat to their 
vital interests. This m~ght be accomplished by introducing 
a paragraph in the messages, as well as in the background 
information, that indicates the potential impact of the 
conflict on Sirraco's supplies of xenthoxide. This would 
serve to increase the salience of dependency as a factor to 
be considered. 
A final consideration is the possibility that the 
methods of measurement were not sufficiently sensitive. It 
was assumed that subjects would respond directly to the issue 
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of an increase in the price of illium. However, subjects 
responded with a myriad of complex and divergent solutions. 
The majority did not even specify a position with regards the 
price of illium (56%}. This made it nearly impossible to 
assess the level of Sirraco's support. Future research may 
need to force a decision on this issue in order to adequately 
assess the impact of strategy and dependency factors on third 
party support. 
These five factors may have influenced the results of 
this study in ways unforseen by the theory or in ways that 
interfered with the impact of the variables. Before sub-
sequent research can be conducted with any confidence 
questions concerning the integrity of the research design 
need to be addressed. The selection of subjects needs to be 
broadened to include nonstudents, older and more politically 
conservative people. Furthermore, the presentation of the 
role-playing situation needs to be restructured to test for 
the possible design effects outlined in this section. 
It needs to be emphasized that these concerns represent 
only tentative explanations for the observed results. They 
are presented for consideration in the hopes that they will 
lead to a strengthening of future research necessary to 
provide firm conclusions. The next section looks at the 
implications of the findings examined here for the conduct 
of future research. 
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Implications for Further Research 
This study was exploratory and was not intended as an 
exhaustive examination of the efficacy of nonviolence as a 
strategy of protest and conflict management. This research 
showed that nonviolence was successful at influencing the 
intervention of a powerful third party. More research is 
needed to verify this conclusion and to explore other 
dimensions of the nonviolent situation which may influence 
its impact. 
Yet to be explored is the impact of a nonviolent strategy 
on the opposition. Does nonviolence have a significant effect 
on the opposition in and of itself and, if so, how strong is 
that effect? How important is pressure brought to bear by 
the third party and what kind or combination of pressure is 
necessary? The impact of the nonviolent strategy could be 
strengthened or diminished by the position taken by the third 
party. Conceivably, the third party could support the 
opposition, support the protesters, or remain neutral. 
Also to be explored is the impact of nonviolence when 
confronted by a nonviolent opposition. How important is the 
contrast effect between strategies? It seems reasonable to 
assume that a contrast effect would not only serve to drama-
tize the conflict but also to enhance the moral position of 
the protesters. However, what happens when the opposition 
refuses to engage in grossly violent or repressive 
activities? Will nonviolence work when the opposition merely 
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"waits them out?" Ultimately, the question reduces to an 
assessment of the importance of "violence" to a nonviolent 
strategy. 
One further area that needs to be explored is variations 
in the power relationships between the parties to the conflict. 
In this research the third party was presented as clearly 
superior in all respects to the other nations. What happens 
when 'Ehe -t:hird party is- ~nc:ft- clearly superior? - Would dt"fferen-t: 
"rules of coalition" apply if the third party were of equal 
power to one or the other, or if the third party, in coali-
tion with the protesters was only equal in power to the 
opposition? This area of power is a critical dimension for 
a theory of nonviolent protest. 
Research which addresses questions such as these would 
serve to increase our understanding of nonviolent conflict 
management. Continued research would also serve to help those 
researchers and practitioners who seek to understand and 
control the destructive tendencies which threaten the world 
community. 
Summary 
The results of this study indicated that strategy and 
dependency factors did have a significant effect on the 
perceptions and behavior of the subjects. The nonviolent 
strategy was more effective than the violent strategy at 
eliciting third party support. Dependency factors did not 
result in behavioral differences in support but did clearly 
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influence subject perceptions of the conflict situation. 
This chapter also examined several possible 
alternative explanations for the observed results. These 
explanations centered on sample bias, subject expectations, 
message order, the salience of dependency, and measurement. 
Future research must carefully examine the possible impact of 
these five factors and control for any possible influence. 
li'utu-re -research- needs-~s-till to examine_ ~the irnnact of 
the nonviolent strategy on the opposition; the impact of 
nonviolence when confronted by nonviolent resistance; and 
variation in power relationships between the third party 
and the others. Each of these areas requires further 
exploration and elaboration. 
124 
ENDNOTES 
1 See the discussion in C.L. Gruder, "Social Power in 
Interpersonal Negotiation," The Structure of Conflict, 
edited by Paul G. Swingle (New York: Academic Press, 1970), 
pp. 137ff. 
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INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
It is the right of every participant in a research 
project to be informed of the nature of that project. The 
Department of Speech and Drama at the University of Kansas 
supports the practice of protection for human subjects 
participating in research. The following information is 
provided so that you can decide whether you want to parti-
cipate in the present study. You should be aware that even 
if you participate you are free to withdraw at any time, 
without prejudice. 
You are being asked to participate in a study of 
connnunication and conflict. We are interested in your 
connnunication behavior given different kinds of conflict 
situations. You will be asked to read background informa-
tion about the conflict, respond to the conflicting parties, 
and then, cfill out a survey concerning your reactions to the 
situation. To do this you will be asked to assume the role 
of one of the conflicting parties. 
The conflict exists between three nations. The role 
you assume will be as the leader of one of the nations 
involved. Information concerning your relationship to the 
others and the nature of the conflict will be provided later. 
There are several conflict situations. You will be asked to 
respond to only one. The time involved in this study is 
about one hour. 
You will be given a packet of information, response 
sheets and the survey. On the upper right hand corner of 
the information packet is an index number. This number must 
be placed on the upper right hand corner of the response 
sheets and the survey {as indicated). This is necessary so 
that your reactions can be matched to the specific conflict 
situation that you responded to. All that is asked is that 
you respond honestly to the situation. 
We are unaware of any harmful aspects of this study. 
However, if at any time you feel threatened or perceive any 
possible harm or injury to yourself, withdraw and notify 
the experimenter. All information gathered will be anonymous. 
At no time will your name be associated with any of the 
studies data. If you have any questions please ask. 
Thank you. 
I have read the description of the experimental situation 
provided above and have offered to participate. My partici-
pation is voluntary and I understand that I may withdraw at 




Terry M. Perkins 
Department of Speech and Drama 








You are asked to place yourself in the role of the 
leader of Sirraco who must make a decision about Sirraco's 
position in a conflict between two countries with whom it 
shares common borders. The conflict is of concern because 
it poses a threat to a long standing relationship, character-
ized by friendship and cooperation, between the three nations. 
It is important that you assume this role with the realiza-
tion that you are responsible for the well being and security 
of your people. The pursuit of these interests may very well 
place you in direct conflict with others (and even with some 
of your own personal values). However, your primary 
responsibility is to look after the interest's of your~ 
people. 
What follows is a series of reports and messages that 
pertain to this situation. There will be description of 
Sirraco's capability to exercise influence in the situation, 
a fact finding report from the Sirracan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and messages sent to you by the leaders of the 
nations involved in the dispute. After you have read this 
information you will be asked to respond to the conflicting 
parties and to react to the conflict itself. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: SIRRACO'S RELATIONSHIP TO THEBES 
AND ZIMBA 
Sirraco has been a valued and trusted friend of both 
Thebes and Zimba for many years. Not only do the three 
countries share a common border, they are also politically 
'and ideologically aligned. The stability of the entire 
region depends upon their remaining cooperative. It seems 
only reasonable, then, that both Zimba and Thebes would turn 
to Sirraco in time of trouble, seeking advice and assistance. 
Sirraco is strong enough to impose its will on both 
Thebes and Zimba (and the other two nations know this), but 
it has seldom done so, preferring to work~with them in solv-
ing problems. This does not mean that Sirraco has not or 
would not use its considerable economic, political and 
military power to force the acceptance of some policy if it 
believed it to be in Sirraco's best interests. 
Sirraco, Thebes and Zimba not only share common border 
but they also share a common access to the sea (see map 
below). There are no troops or military installations along 
their joining borders, but they all maintain a strong naval 
presence in the Sea of Agran. Militarily Sirraco is by far 
the strongest and has supplied military aid and training to 
both Thebes and Zimba. Zimba is the weakest militarily. 
Because of the world political situation all three nations 
keep a standing army in ready reserve. In essence Sirraco, 
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Thebes and Zimba stand together as a world political and 
military force against another block of nations that are 
ideologically opposed to their way of life. 
Sirraco also has extensive economic interests in both 
Zimba and Thebes; providing large grants in aid to both 
countries. Economically, Sirraco is by far the wealthiest 
nation and whereas an economic downturn in another country 
might cause some discomfort it would not seriously impair 
its economic progress. In general, business dealings between 
the three nations have always been cordial and mutually 
profitable. 
Siraco has dealt with both of these countries long and 
often enough to know that they mean what they say. They may 
at times see the world differently, but when they believe 
themselves to be right they are not easily dissuaded. They 
can be extremely stubborn and compromise can be extremely 
difficult to achieve. This poses a very realdilemma for 
Sirraco inthe present situation. 
Sirraco has the capacity to lend aid and assistance to 
these countries but the choice of who to support and how 
present a real problem. Sirraco could easily intervene 
militarily and quickly impose a settlement on the parties 
involved. It could withdraw or increase investments in one 
country or another to soften or induce acceptance of a --
proposed solution. It could provide developmental grants to 
either country which could be used to promote economic growth. 
It could rely upon diplomatic discussion and persuasion. All 
these are possible, but the choice must be conditioned by 




The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is 
vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide 
is essential in the development and manufacturing of many of 
Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this 
time Thebes is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply 
of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's needs. Conse-
quently, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to keep the 
supply of Xenthoxide from Thebes secure. If Sirraco were to 
lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they 
would be dependent on countries which are its political and 
military enemies forany future supply-.-This could --
destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of 
its people and the security of the nation this is a condition 
which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances. 
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 
FACT FINDING REPORT 
THE THEBAN-ZIMBAN COMFLICT 
Zimba is a federated state within the commonwealth of 
Thebes. This means that Zimba and Thebes are politically, 
economically and culturally related, but that they are 
independent and autonomous. Zimba mines a raw material call-
ed illium which it sells exclusivel~ to Thebes. Thebes has 
the technological skill and the capital to process illium and 
make trillium; a valuable new energy source. Illium is the 
foundation of Zimba's economy and because Thebes is its only 
market, it is highly dependent on its sister state. 0th~ 
possible markets either have enough illium of their own, or 
they lack the technology to process it into trillium. 
' Whereas Zimba is underdeveloped, Thebes is a progressive 
and technologically advanced state. Because Thebes is highly 
developed, it is a wealthy state and most of its wealth comes 
from the sale of trillium. Thebes sells trillium on the open 
market for about $150 a ton. Where illium is the foundation 
for Zimba's economy, trillium is the foundation for Thebes' 
economy. Zimba supplies Thebes with 40% of the illium it 
needs. The other 60% is mined by Theban companies under 
strict government control. 
It costs $5 a ton to mine illium. Zimba produces and 
sells 10,000 tons a day. Traditionally, Thebes has purchased 
illium for $20 a ton. This income has been sufficient to 
meet Zimba's basic needs. Thebes processes illium at a cost 
of $10 a ton, thus it costs Thebes $30 a ton to produce 
trillium from Zimban sources. It costs only $15 a ton to 
produce trillium from Theban sources. Thebes sells trillium 
for $150 a ton. Because of international competition, to 
raise the price of trillium above $150 is next to impossible. 
It would result in canceled orders and the loss of revenue. 
The production costs which Z,imba and Thebes pay are stable 
(fixed); the technology involved is such that there is little 
likelihood that production costs will increase in the forsee-
able future. Currently, the only figure that is subject to 
change is the selling price of illium. 
The current price for illium was set at a time when 
Zimba was just beginning to tap its resources and needed a 
lot of investment capital. The capital was provided by 
Thebes on the condition that Zimba not acquire the hardware 
to process illium into trillium. Now, all these loans have 
been paid back and Zimba is no longer in Thebes debt. 
Zimba now believes that the price of illium should be raised 
and has often expressed this belief publically and in 
negotiations with Thebes, but with no effect. 
Zimba believes some action must be taken. However, the 
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problem is that illium is the foundation of Zimba's economy 
and Thebes is the only buyer. Any disruption of the purchase 
of illium would cause Zimba's economy to suffer. A short 
disruption of 2-3 months would be tolerable, but any disrup-
tion longer than this would all but destroy its economy. 
Currently, the people of Zimba have a low standard of living. 
Thebes is in a much more comfortable position. Whereas 
trillium remains the foundation of its prosperity there is 
greater diversity within its economy. Since Thebes produces 
60% of its own illium any disruption of supplies from Zimba 
would have minimal short term effects. It would require a 
disruption of 6-12 months-i:o-cause any serious damage, and 
even longer to undermine its economy. Currently, the people 
of Thebes have a high standard of living. 
There has been considerable and mounting pressure from 
citizen groups, labor and business interests within Zimba to 
take some action to pressure Thebes into paying a higher 
price. Tempers are running high on both sides. Thebes 
resents any attempt to increase prices and "destabilize" the 
exchange. Zimba believes the price should be set according 
to the needs of the country. Zimba's reasoning is that 
Thebes can easily get along with less, but Zimba, to prosper, 
must have more. Zimbans believe that Thebes holds an unfair 
advantage in the relationship and through Thebes monopoly on 
illium they control the destiny of Zimba. 
An increase in the price from $20 to $50 a ton for 
illium is what Zimba is asking. Zimba believes that such an 
increase would provide an acceptable margin for economic 
expansion without causing undue distress in Thebes. Zimba's 
profits would rise from $15 a ton to $45 a ton. Thebes 
profits would drop from $120 a ton to $90 a ton on the 40% 
of trillium processed from Zimban sources. The profits on 
the other 60% would remain at $120 a ten. A price of $5,0 a 
ton would certainly slow Thebes economic growth and might 





DEPENDENCY CONDITION #1: Sirraco dependent on Thebes 
The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is 
vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide 
is essential in the developemnt and manufacturing of many 
of Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this 
time Thebes is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply 
of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's needs. Consequent-
ly, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to keep the supply 
of Xenthoxide from Thebes secure. If Sirraco were to lose 
this source or suffer even a short term disruption they 
would be dependent on countries which are its political and 
military enemies forany future supply-.-This could --
destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of 
its people and the security of the nation this is a condition 
which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances. 
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DEPENDENCY CONDITION #2: Sirraco dependent on Zimba 
The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is vital-
ly dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide is 
essential in the development and manufacturing of many of 
Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this 
time Zimba is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply 
of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's needs. 
Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to keep the 
supply of Xenthoxide from Zimba secure. If Sirraco were to 
lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they 
would be dependent on countries which are its political and 
military enemies forany future supplies':- This could --
destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of 
its people and the security of the nation this is a condition 
which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances. 
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DEPENDENCY CONDITION #3: Sirraco dependent on Both Thebes 
and Zimba 
The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is 
vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide 
is essential in the development and manufacturing of man'y 
of Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this 
time Thebes and Zimba are the only "friendly" nations which 
have a supply of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's 
needs. Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to 
keep the supply of Xenthoxide from Thebes and Zimba secure. 
If Sirraco were to lose this source or suffer even a short 
term disruption they would be dependent on countries which 
are its political and militar"y enenies for any future supplies. 
This could destabilize the world balance of power. For the 
welfare of its people and the security of the nation this is 
a condition which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances. 
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DEPENDENCY CONDITION #4: Sirraco relatively independent 
Even though Sirraco has considerable economic investments 
in both Thebes and Zimba, Sirraco does not depend on either 
of them for any vital resources or support. The main reason 
for association is ideological and historical similarities., 
In other words, they share similar values and a common 
heritage. Militarily, Sirraco is quite capable of dealing 
with most, if not all, threats to its security unaided. 
Sirraco's interest in Thebes and Zimba is based upon long 









We turn to you for assistance in time of great national 
trouble. Our neighbor, Thebes, has exploited our people and 
our resources for many years. It is time that Zimbans assert 
their right to fair and just compensation for their labor 
and their national resources. It is time that the suffering 
and the humiliation that we have suffered at the hands of our 
"friends," the Thebans, be ended. It is time that we walk 
tall, our heads high and with pride in our hearts. 
In times past, Thebes arrogantly tapped our wealth that 
is the source of their prosperity -- illium. We were a poor 
and underdeveloped nation easily fooled by the promises of 
prosperity that Thebes offered. We accepted their promises, 
we trusted them, and we were deluded by them. We soon found 
ourselves to be little better than puppets in their hands. 
We do not have mastery over our own fate. The root of all 
this evil can be found in Thebes• control over our economy 
through the purchasing of illium. The Thebans steal our 
illium while claiming that they pay a "fair" price -- a 
fair price that barely enables us to survive. 
While our people struggle and die due to the lack of 
proper sanitary and health systems; while our people suffer 
in ignorance due to inadequate education; while our people 
go hungry due to antiquated and insufficient agricultural 
techniques--the Thebans live in good health, are well 
educated and are well fed. And who has patd the price for 
their well being? The people of Zimba! 
The people of Zimba have a right to the pursuit of 
security, health and future prosperity. The people of Zimba 
have a right to be free of the domination of others. The 
people of Zimba have a right to pass on the fruits of their 
labor to their children. All that the people of Zimba ask 
is that they be given what is rightly theirs -- a truly fair 
price based upon their need. 
The future of Zimba depends upon the diversification 
and the development of our economy. Illium is a finite 
resource. Someday it will be gone and we must be prepared. 
But we cannot prepare while we lack the freedom and the 
finances necessary to accomplish our goals. Our goals are 
not unreasonable nor our demands unfair. All we ask is that 
Thebes pay us a "fair" price for our illium. If they will 
do this, then we can achieve our modest goals. 
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The increase that we ask is not excessive. It represents 
the barest minimum that we must have if we are to achieve 
our goals. This increase in revenue is essential if we are 
to engage in the cautious, careful and responsible program 
of economic development that Zimba so desperately needs. The 
increase in income would allow for a gradual rise in the 
standard of living. It would allow us to provide better 
health care, education, housing and more food. We have 
deserved better than we have received at the hands of our 
neighbor. 
Whereas this would mean a great deal to us, its 
overall impact on Thebes would be minimal. The price we are 
asking would represent only a 6% overall decrease in income 
and only a 9% overall increase in costs. This would not 
seriously impair the economy of Thebes. 
If Thebes cannot be persuaded to meet our demands then 
we are left with little choice. Even though it would mean 
severe hardship for our people, and inevitable retaliation 
from Thebes, we will refuse to sell any more illium to Thebes. 
We will never give inl It is not our wish to inflict injury 
or harm the innocent people caught in the middle of this 
struggle, but Thebes must be made to understand the 
seriousness of our plight and the firmness of our resolve. 
Under no circumstances will we engage in senseless acts of 
violence against our neighbor. It is not our way to inflict 
needless harm on others. It is better that we suffer the 
hardships that will ensue than to subject the innocent to 
any more harm than is necessary to dramatize our plight. 
Undoubtedly, the hardships will be greater for us than 
for Thebes, but it is a sacrifice we must make if we are to 
maintain our own sense of dignity and independence. We have 
lived long enough under domination and oppression. We will 
be free! We will be masters of our own destiny, even if 
that means we are masters only of the way we die. 
But there is no need for any to suffer. If Thebes can 
only be made to realize the justice of our claims, all this 
can be averted. Dear friend, we ask for your assistance. 
You can make Thebes listen to our plea. You can convince 
Thebes to see the right in our cause. You can force Thebes 
to feel the hunger of our children. Without your aid we 
will always be little more than slaves. With your aid we can 
be proud and independent people. Please, do not deny us. 





We will no longer put up with the extortion and oppres-
sion imposed upon us by our neighbor. We intend to teach 
them a lesson they will never forget. We have a right to 
defend our lives and our honor, and if you will join with us 
we can give them a resounding defeat; wrenching our freedom 
from their nlood-stained hands. We will fight this battle 
on the field of honor, and we will win! 
Thebes has exploited our people and our resources for 
many years. It is time that we fight for what is rightly 
ours. We have asked Thebes to pay a "fair" price for our 
illium and they refuse. Now, it is time that we force them 
to pay fair and just compensation for our labor and our 
nation's resources. It is time that we treat Thebes to a 
taste of the suffering and humiliation that we have suffered 
at their hands. 
In times past, Thebes arrogantly tapped our wealth that 
is the source of their prosperity -- illium. We were a poor 
and underdeveloped nation, easily fooled by the promises of 
prosperity which Thebes offered. They lied to us, and for 
this we hate them. We accepted their promises, we trusted 
them, and we were betrayed by them. We soon found ourselves 
to be little better than puppets in their hands. We will be 
puppets no longer! We will cut the strings that bind us with 
the sword of wrath. The puppet masters will be made to 
bleed. They will feel the sting of our fury. They will be 
taught that we are not animals to be domesticated and trained 
to jump through hoops. 
The root of all this evil can be found in Thebes" 
control over our economy through the purchasing of illium. 
The Thebans steal our illium while claiming that they pay a 
fair price. A fair price?! While our people struggle and 
die due to the lack of proper sanitary and health systems; 
while our people go hungry due to antiquated and insufficient 
agricultural techniques; while our people suffer in ignorance 
due to inadequate education -- the Thebans live in good health, 
are well educated and grow fat. And who has payed the price 
for their well being? The people of Zimba! 
The people of Zimba will no longer pay the bill. The 
people of Zimba have a right to the pursuit of security, 
health and future prosperity. The people of Zimba have a 
right to be free of the domination of others. The people of 
Zimba have a right to pass on the fruits of their labor to 
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their children. All that the people of Zimba ask is that 
they be given what is rightly theirs -- a truly fair price 
based upon their need. 
The future of Zimba depends upon the diversification 
and the development of our economy. Illium is a finite 
resource. Someday it will be gone and we must be prepared. 
But we cannot prepare while we lack the freedom and the 
finances necessary to accomplish our goals. Our goals are 
not unreasonable nor our demands unfair. All that is asked 
is that Thebes pay a "fair" price for our illiurn and they 
have refused. 
The increase that we ask is not excessive. It repre-
sents the barest minimum that we must have if we are to 
achieve our goals. This increase in revenue is essential if 
we are to engage in the cautious, careful and responsible 
program of economic development that Zimba so desperately 
needs. The increase in income would allow for a gradual rise 
in the standard of living. It would allow us to provide 
better health care, education, housing and more food. But, 
we are denied. As we are made to suffer, so shall those who 
torment us be made to suffer. 
Thebes claims that the price we ask is too much; that it 
would ruin their economy. Absurd! Its overall impact would 
be minimal. The price asked represents only a 6% overall 
decrease in income and only a 9% overall increase in costs. 
This would not seriously impair the economy'of Thebes. But 
they are a callous and greedy lot. Like misers they horde 
their wealth, unable to realize that it cannot, should not, 
be substituted for life and friendship. They are a shriveled 
and soulless people. 
Since Thebes cannot be persuaded to meet our demands, 
we are left with little choice. Even though it means severe 
hardship for our people, and inevitable retaliation from 
Thebes, we will no longer sell illium to Thebes until they 
give us a fair price. To hasten their decision, we have 
already mobilized our army and are ready to strike. At this 
moment, our navy is proceeding to attack and destroy Thebes' 
harbors. Our fighters have been scrambled to meet any air 
invasion. They will lose more by refusing our offer than 
by accepting. Thebes must be made to pay! 
We will never give in! Thebes may appear strong, but 
it is rotten throughout. It will soon crumble from its own 
decay. But, the new order can be hastened with your help. 
Together we can deal Thebes such a defeat that it will never 
again be able to force her will on others. The evil must be 
rooted out, even if some of the innocent must perish. There 
is no room in the world for the evil which is known as 
Thebes. 
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Thebes must be destroyed, and the more quickly the 
better. Friend, we ask you to join with us to crush the 
life from this most insidious evil. With you fighting along 
side us we will present an invincible front. Together we 
can rid the world of yet another threat to freedom loving 





You must join with us to crush a most insidious threat 
to the well being of our people. Our neighbor, Zimba, moti-
vated by greed, is even now engaging in activities which will 
bring great harm to the stability of the region. Whereas we 
have always treated Zimba fairly in all our dealings, they 
have the audacity to make unreasonable and unjust demands of 
us. They demand that we pay an excessively high price for 
illium, or they will punish us. This is nothing short of 
extortion. We are poised to punish them for their affrontery. 
As you know, in the past, we have given generously to 
Zimba so that they could grow and prosper. They were a poor 
and underdeveloped nation and we took pity on them; providing 
technological and economic assistance. After all that we 
have done for them, they now turn against us, claiming that 
we have exploited them for our own selfish aggrandizement. 
They have the audacity to claim that we have stolen the 
future of their nation. NOT SO! Without us they would have 
no future worth speaking of; without us, they would still be 
living in stone huts; without us, they would still be 
savages, little better than wild dogs. 
The people of Thebes have been diligent and prosperous; 
building better lives for ourselves and our children. We 
have succeeded in building a life that is the envy of many. 
It is undoubtedly this envy which causes Zimba to make the 
stupid demands they do. We will not allow the fruits of our 
labor to be spoiled by the avarice of Zimba. We have a duty 
to guard the welfare of our people. We will not allow some 
third rate country to disrupt our society. We will fight to 
preserve it. 
Zimba claims that they lack the funds necessary for 
development and growth. This is a total absurdity. They have 
more than enough to allow proper, patient growth. Zimba, like 
a child, merely lacks patience and like all impatient children 
they do not want to accept the basic fact of life. Like all 
unruly children they must be punished when they are wrong so 
that they will not continue to harm others. Zimba does not 
have the right to pursue its selfish goals at the expense of 
others. 
The price they ask is grossly unfair. To give in to the 
demands of Zimba would cause us great hardship and we do not 
intend to accept it peacefully. The price they ask would 
represent a 50% increase in the costs of producing trillium; 
resulting in a loss of $30,000,000 a month. Losses such as 
these cannot be considered reasonable and fair. Losses such 
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as these would have severe repercussions for our economy, our 
lives and our future. 
Since Zimba cannot be persuaded that their demands are 
unfair, we are left with little choice. Taking direct 
military and economic action against Zimba will cause us 
great suffering, but we will not be blackmailed into 
jeopardizing the future of our people. It is always sad 
that the innocent must suffer for the sins of others. If 
Zimba will not sell us illium, then we must take it; and if 
in doing so they suffer, then so be it. We fully intend to 
punish them for their crimes. 
We will never give in! Already our forces are being 
marshalled so as to punish Zimba. Our Air Force is poised 
to strike deep into the heart of our enemy. Our Navy is 
massing to blockade Zimba's ports. There is no doubt that 
Zimba will be treated to a resounding defeat. Never again 
will we allow them to be in a position to harm us, even if 
that means taking control of their country; a burden we do 
not relish. 
Zimba must be made to suffer, but its suffering can be 
shortened if it can be made to give up its foolish demands. 
Friend we ask you to join with us to end this unfounded 
threat to our nation. With you fighting by our side Zimba 
would collapse easily. Together we can force Zimba to see 
the error of its way. With your aid we are assured of an 
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Now that you have finished your messages, you are asked 
to fill out a survey concerning your reactions to the 
conflict situation, your perceptions and your choices. Below 
you will see a series of statements followed by certain 
response choices. You are to circle the response choice that 
best expresses your feelings or beliefs. 
EXAMPLE: 
The energy crisis in the U.S. is 
very real 
N = neutral 
SD D N A SA 
A= agree SD= strongly disagree 
D = disagree SA= strongly agree 
If you strongly disagree with this statement, circle the 
letters SD. 
If you agreed with this statement, but not strongly, circle 
the letter A. 
You will find that not all of the questions below pertain to 
your experience. If you believe a question is not applicable 
or if you are undecided circle the letter N. If you have any 
questions please ask. Leave no statement unmarked. 
i. Thebes' approach to this whole SD 
situation could be called 
nonviolent. 
2. Sirraco's support is the key SD 
to Ziroba's success. 
3. Because of Sirraco's dependence SD 
on Xenthoxide I felt pressured 
to support Thebes. 
4. My choice of action was SD 
influenced mostly by 
economic considerations. 
5. I decided to rely upon SD 
persuasion as the best means 
of achieving a solution. 
6. I thought this conflict -SD 








N A SA 
N A SA 
N A SA 
N A SA 
N A SA 
N A SA 
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7. Zimba's approach to this whole SD D N A SA 
situation could be called 
nonviolent. 
8. Zimba and Thebes are equal in SD D N A SA 
terms cf power. 
9. Because of Sirraco's SD D N A SA 
dependence on Xenthoxide I 
felt pressured to support 
Zimba. 
10. I decided that economic SD D N A SA 
sanctions were the best way to 
achieve a solution. 
11. My choice of action was SD D N A SA 
influenced mostly by moral 
considerations. 
J.2. I haven't the slightest idea SD D N A SA 
as to what this experiment 
was trying to prove. 
13. Zimba was wrong in making its SD D N A SA 
demands for a price increase. 
14. I thought the tone of Zimba's SD D N A SA 
message was quite hostile. 
15. Sirraco is stronger than Zimba SD D N A SA 
and Thebes combined. 
16. I chose to support Zimba's SD D N A SA 
position against Thebes. 
17. The welfare of my own people SD D N A SA 
was my major concern. 
18. Thebes had dominated and SD D N A SA 
exploited Zimba. 
19. I decided that military action SD D N A SA 
was the best way to achieve a 
solution. 
20. I found this to be an SD D N A SA 
interesting and involving 
experience. 
21. I thought the tone of Thebes SD D N A SA 
message was quite hostile. 
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22. Zimba was not justified in SD D N A SA 
making its demands. 
23. My choice of action was SD D N A SA 
influenced by the approach 
taken by Thebes. 
24. I decided to withdraw invest- SD D N A SA 
ments from Thebes as a method 
of influencing the outcome. 
25. Given the circumstances, I SD D N A SA 
would expect Zimba to react 
violently. 
26. I thought Thebes handled the SD D N A SA 
whole situation rather well. 
27. I chose to support Thebes' SD D N A SA 
position against Zimba. 
28. Sirraco's needs in this SD D N A SA 
situation were of paramount 
importance. 
29. My choice of action was SD D N A SA 
influenced by the approach 
taken by Zimba. 
30. I decided to withdraw invest- SD D N A SA 
ments from Zimba as a means 
of influencing the outcome. 
31. I thought Zimba handled the SD D N A SA 
whole situation rather well. 
32. I chose to support some SD D N A SA 
compromise solution. 
33. I thought the price Zimba was SD D N A SA 
originally paid for illium was 
fair. 
34. I decided to increase invest- SD D N A SA 
ments in Thebes as a means of 
influencing the outcome. 
35. The full amount Zimba asked for SD D N A SA 
was essential to its future 
well being. 
36. I thought Thebes' behavior SD D N A SA 
was inappropriate and out 
of place. 
37. I decided from the beginning 
that Thebes should pay 
Zimba's price. 
38. I decided to increase invest-
ments in Zimba as a means for 
influencing the outcome. 
39. I thought Zimba's behavior was 
inappropriate and out of place. 
40. I decided that the best thing 
for me to do was to stay out of 
it. 
41. Zimba simply did not need as 
much money as it claimed. 
42. I realized that compromise 
could be achieved only if 
Sirraco "paid" for it. 
43. It was in Sirraco's best 
interests to impose a solution. 
44. Sirraco could not afford to 
antagonize the conflicting 
parties. 
45. For any solution to work, the 
parties involved must be 
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Coding Intervention Direction 
Each subject's response will, if possible, be coded 
according to Sirraco's expressed position on the price of 
illium. 
Category 1 -- A response is coded as category 1 if Sirraco 
advocates or supports a price that falls within 
$46.00 to $50.00. 
Category 2 -- A response is coded as category 2 if Sirraco 
advocates or supports a price that falls within 
the range of $35.00 to $45.00. 
Category 3 -- A response is coded as category 3 if Sirraco 
advocates or supports a price that falls within 
the range of $20.00 to $34.00. 
Category 4 -- A response is coded as category 4 if Sirraco 
advocates or supports a price increase but does 
not specify the amount. 
Category 5 -- A response is coded as category 5 if Sirraco 
advocates or supports some form of negotiation 
without specifying a position with regard to 
the price of illium. 
Category 6 -- A response is coded as category 6 if it is 
uninterpretable as expressed. 
Coding Intervention Means 
Each subject's response will, if possible, be coded 
according to the methods or mechanisms of intervention and 
influence employed by Sirraco. 
Avoidance 
Negotiation 
· Economic l 
A response is coded as avoidance if Sirraco 
expresses an unwillingness to become involved 
in the conflict. 
A response is coded as negotiation if Sirraco 
advocates or demands that the conflicting 
parties meet and discuss their differences, if 
Sirraco offers to serve as a mediator or 
arbitrator, or if Sirraco calls for a su:mroit 
meeting., 
A response is coded as economic 1 if Sirraco 
promises economic aid to Zimba but not Thebes. 
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Economic 2 A response is coded as economic 2 if Sirraco 
promises economic aid to Thebes but not Zimba. 
Economic 3 A response is coded as economic 3 if Sirraco 
promises economic aid to both Zimba and Thebes. 
Military A response is coded as military if Sirraco 
threatens the use of military action or 
reprisals. 
Miscellaneous A response is coded miscellaneous if the 
method of intervention is unclear, missing, 
or uninterpretable. 
Coding Motives 
Each subjects response will, if possible, be coded 
according to the statement used to complete the phrase, "I 








A response is coded as antiviolence if the 
statement expresses a total rejection of 
violence as a method of resolving conflict. 
A response is coded as pro nonviolence if 
the statement expresses a preference for 
nonviolent means of conflict management as 
the only or best way to solve the problem. 
A response is coded as pacifist if the 
statement expresses a strong desire to 
keep the peace, regardless of the cost. 
A response is coded as fairness if the 
statement expresses a position that places 
Zimba's needs as paramount and sees 
Sirraco as acting out of a desire for 
justice or because of a moral obligation. 
A response is coded as self-interest if 
the statement expresses the position that 
Sirraco's needs, either economic or 
national security, were most important. 
A response is coded as compromise if the 
statement expresses the position that 
compromise is the only or best way to 
solve conflicts. 
A response is coded as miscellaneous if 
the statement is uninterpretable or if 






Direction of Support 
#16 I chose to support Zimba' s position against Thebes. 
#27 I chose to support Thebes' position against Zimba. 
#32 I chose to support some compromise solution. 
Section 2 
The Perceived Legitimacy of Demands 
#13 Zimba was wrong in making its demands for a price 
increase. 
#22 Zimba was not justified in making its demands. 
#33 I thought the price Zimba was originally paid for 
illium was fair. 
#35 The full amount Zimba asked for was essential to its 
future well being. 
#41 Zimba simply did not need as much money as it claimed. 
Section 3 
The Perceived Legitimacy of Strategy 
#26 I thought Thebes handled the whole situation rather 
well. 
#31 I thought Zimba handled the whole situation rather well. 
#36 I thought Thebes' behavior was inappropriate and out 
of place. 




#5 I decided to rely upon persuasion as the best means of 
achieving a solution. 
#10 I decided that economic sanctions were the best way to 
achieve a solution. 
#19 I decided that military action was the best way to 
achieve a solution. 
#24 I decided to withdraw investments from Thebes as a 
method of influencing the outcome. 
#30 I decided to withdraw invest~ents from Zimba as a 
means of influencing the outcome. 
#34 I decided to increase investments in Thebes as a 
means of influencing the outcome. 
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#38 I decided to increase investments in Zimba as a means 
of influencing the outcome. 
#40 I decided the best thing for me to do was to stay 
out of it. 
Section 5 
Motives 
a. The perceived impact of strategy on support. 
#11 My choice of action was influenced mostly by moral 
considerations. 
#23 My choice of action was influenced by the approach 
taken by Thebeso 
j29 My choice of action was influenced by the approach 
taken by Zimba. 
b. The perceived impact of dependence on support. 
#3 Because of Sirraco's dependence on xenthoxide I felt 
pressured to support Thebes. 
#9 Because of Sirraco's dependence on xenthoxide I felt 
pressured to support Zimba. 
#4 My choice of action was influenced mostly by economic 
considerations. 
#17 The welfare of my own people was my major concern. 
#28 Sirraco's needs in this situation were of paramount 
importance. 






il Thebes' approach to this whole situation could be called 
nonviolent. 
#7 Zimba's approach to this whole situation could be called 
nonviolent. 
#14 I thought the tone of Zimba's message was quite hostile. 
121 I thought the tone of Thebes' message was quite hostile. 
b. Expectations 
#25 Given the circumstances, I would expect Zimba to react 
violently. 
c. Power Relationships 
#2 Sirraco's support is the key to Zimba's ~uccess. 
#8 Zimba and Thebes are equal in terms of power. 
#15 Sirraco is stronger than Z!mba and Thebes combined. 
#18 Thebes has dominated and exploited Zimba. 
d. Realism 
#6 I thought this conflict represented a realistic 
situation. 
e. Interest 
#20 I found this to be an interesting and involving 
experience. 
f. Demand Characteristics 
J12 I haven't the slightest ideas as to what this experiment 
is trying to prove. 
#37 I decided from the very beginning that Thebes should 







Age N Gender Class Level Affiliation 
16-20 48 Male 44 Fresh 31 Demo 29 
21-25 49 Female 72 Soph 24 Repub 22 
26;;_30 11 ll6 Jr 21 Independ 51 
31-35 3 Sr 27 Other 14 
36-40 3 Other 13 116 
41-45 1 116 
mean= 22.2 Ethnic Grou~ Religion Political Ident 
Black 17 Catholic 23 Liberal 35 
Caucasian 90 Protest. 61 Moderate 48 
Hispanic 2 Other 32 Conserv. 7 
Oriental 3 116 Other 26 
Other 4 11.6 
116 
